Joe Franco Garza

Case overview

Joe Franco Garza, Jr. was convicted of capital murder committed on December 31, 1998 under Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(2). Based on the jury’s answers to the special issues under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 37.071, sections 2(b) and 2(e), the trial judge sentenced him to death.

Timeline

• December 31, 1998 — Joe Franco Garza, Jr. committed capital murder.
• April 2000 — A jury convicted Joe Franco Garza, Jr., and the trial court sentenced him to death for the capital murder.
• September 18, 2002 — The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal (Garza v. State, No. AP-73,850).
• October 22, 2003 — The Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief on Garza’s Article 11.071 application for a writ of habeas corpus (Ex parte Garza, No. WR-56,961-01).
• August 31, 2005 — A federal district court granted habeas relief on ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to obtain and use mitigating evidence at punishment, vacated the death sentence, and remanded for a new punishment hearing or imposition of a life sentence (Garza v. Dretke, No. 5:03-CV-284-C).
• April 24, 2006 — Following a new punishment hearing, the trial court again sentenced Joe Franco Garza, Jr. to death.
• November 26, 2008 — The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment and sentence of death.

The offence

The capital murder involved the 71-year-old preacher Silbiano Rangel.

Garza was drinking at his cousin’s house when someone there called Rangel and asked him to come over. Rangel gave Garza and his cousin a ride to a liquor store to buy beer. After they got to the store, Garza and his cousin realized they had no money. Rangel drove them to the house of a friend, where Garza’s cousin went inside to try to borrow money.

While she was in the house, Garza, who was sitting behind Rangel, strangled Rangel with a sock. When his cousin returned to the truck, Garza ordered her to help him move Rangel’s body into the back of the truck. Garza took Rangel’s wallet, jewelry, and truck, and he dropped his cousin off at her friend’s house.

Garza drove the stolen truck to the house of his 13-year-old pregnant girlfriend, where he lied to Rangel’s friend who noticed the truck and asked about Rangel. He then woke his girlfriend and took her with him to Dallas in Rangel’s truck, stopping along the way to pawn Rangel’s ring and make purchases with Rangel’s checks.

In Dallas, Garza gave or sold the truck to a stranger and borrowed money from a friend. He and his girlfriend returned by bus to Lubbock. Later, Garza bought a newspaper and read it to see if there had been a report of Rangel’s death. The morning after the murder, Rangel’s body was found on the side of the road with the sock still tied around his neck. There was testimony that Rangel’s injuries were consistent with him having struggled before he died. The medical examiner testified that injuries on Rangel’s face were consistent with blunt force trauma.

Garza then robbed Rangel and stole his truck.

Investigation

The record included medical testimony regarding Rangel’s injuries and testimony regarding strangulation and blunt force trauma consistent with struggle before death.

Trial

Special issues and future dangerousness

Garza argued that the evidence was legally insufficient to support an affirmative finding on the issue of future dangerousness.

When reviewing the future-dangerousness special issue, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that it viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determined whether any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a probability that Garza would commit criminal acts of violence constituting a continuing threat to society.

The Court noted that in some cases the circumstances of the offence can be among the most revealing evidence of future dangerousness and alone may be sufficient.

Evidence supporting future dangerousness

The jury heard evidence including Garza’s drinking prior to the killing, the course of the offence, and the post-offence conduct including taking Rangel’s wallet, jewelry, and truck; the relocation with his 13-year-old pregnant girlfriend; pawning Rangel’s ring; making purchases with Rangel’s checks; reading a newspaper to see whether there was a report of Rangel’s death; and the discovery of Rangel’s body with the sock still tied around his neck.

The jury also heard evidence of Garza’s prior history and violent behavior while incarcerated. The Court described evidence of Garza’s violent behavior while in prison as part of the prosecution’s proof aimed at establishing ongoing danger.

The Court set out multiple prior incidents and records, including:

• Garza’s prior juvenile adjudications included burglary and arson.
• Garza was belligerent to a police officer who stopped a stolen car in which Garza was a passenger.
• Garza attempted to escape from the juvenile justice center by kicking out windows, and he fought with responding officers.
• Garza was arrested for carrying a homemade dagger when he was seventeen years old.
• As an adult, Garza was arrested for public intoxication more than once.
• There was evidence that Garza assaulted his girlfriend’s sister by punching her in the face and chasing her to a closet; he broke down the closet door and kicked her repeatedly as she lay on the closet floor; he did not stop until police arrived, and then he fled the house.
• Garza stole a car, guitar, and leather jacket from a man who had given him a ride in the rain.
• By the time of the instant offense, Garza had been adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile or convicted as an adult of several offences including burglary, criminal mischief, theft, arson, evading arrest, resisting arrest, attempted escape, and aggravated robbery.
• Garza was on parole from a burglary conviction when he committed the instant offense.
• Garza’s prison disciplinary record included numerous disciplinary violations: possessing homemade weapons, assaulting inmates, and verbally threatening and verbally abusing corrections officers; one inmate required seventeen stitches after the attack; and another violation involved throwing hot water at a corrections officer.
• There was evidence that Garza had been investigated as a possible prison-gang member in 1994 and 1995.
• During an interview connected to that investigation, Garza did not admit being a gang member, but he told gang-intelligence officers that if San Antonio inmates were not shipped off the unit, they would be "shipped off in coffins."
• Although Garza’s gang membership was not confirmed at that time, the Security Threat Group (“STG”) management office of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) later confirmed him as a Texas Syndicate (“TS”) gang member.

Based on this evidence, the Court held that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a probability Garza would commit criminal acts of violence constituting a continuing threat to society. It overruled Garza’s future-dangerousness point of error.

Jury voir dire challenges for cause

Garza challenged the trial court’s denial of challenges for cause during individual jury voir dire.

• Prospective juror Gerald Smith (Point of error one): The Court described Smith’s responses during voir dire about the future-dangerousness special issue. The Court noted Smith stated he understood “probability” to mean “possibility,” and he responded affirmatively that the fact that Garza had already been convicted of capital murder committed during the course of robbery would have some influence or evidentiary value in his consideration of future dangerousness. The Court also described Smith’s responses about parole instruction as equivocal. It held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the challenge for cause because Smith’s responses did not show he would automatically answer the future-dangerousness issue in the affirmative, and because his responses about parole were equivocal.
• Prospective juror Juan Camacho (Point of error two): Garza argued Camacho lacked intellectual capacity and had limited understanding of English. The Court described Camacho’s responses to definitions and concepts, including that Camacho stated “To me, it's somebody's opinion” regarding probability and gave other answers about “criminal act of violence,” “society,” and “mitigating.” The defense challenged him for cause under Article 35.16(a)(5), and the Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion because Camacho’s lack of familiarity with certain terms did not show he could not understand his duties, and the record did not show a mental defect rendering him unfit for jury service.
• Prospective juror Earlinda Vickers (Point of error four): Garza argued Vickers would find future dangerousness based solely on the capital-murder conviction and that she shifted the burden on mitigation. The Court described her responses as initially indicating some influence from the prior conviction and also indicating she would not automatically find future dangerousness based solely on the conviction and that her answer would depend on the evidence. It held the trial court did not abuse its discretion because her responses were equivocating.
• Prospective juror Charlene Sport (Point of error five): Garza argued Sport wanted some kind of evidence before considering life. The Court described her initial affirmative answer expecting the defense to put on evidence, followed by agreement that she could consider a life sentence if she became aware of mitigating evidence even if the defense had not spoken up. It held her responses were equivocating and supported denial of the challenge for cause.
• Prospective juror Dale Smith (Point of error six): Garza argued Dale Smith would lean toward death. The Court described acknowledgments by Smith that the State had the burden of proof and that he could follow the law to consider a life sentence if warranted. It held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the challenge for cause.

Garza’s arguments in points one, two, four through six were overruled.

Denial of proposed voir dire question about victim’s age (Point of error three)

Garza argued that he was denied the opportunity to question prospective juror Linda Bridges about the effect of the victim’s age on punishment. The Court described the proposed question: "If it were shown at trial that the victim were 71, would that be enough to make you vote in such a way that the death penalty would be imposed, as opposed to a life sentence?"

The trial court denied the proposed question because it went too much into specifics of the case. The Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the juror could consider the victim’s age in determining punishment and she had already indicated she favored death penalty in certain elderly-victim circumstances. It held it would have been improper as well as repetitious to ask whether she would favor death if the victim were 71.

Expert witnesses

Qualification of prison-gang expert (Point of error seven)

Garza complained about admission of testimony from Gus Vaquera as an expert on prison gangs, arguing the State failed to prove he was qualified under Tex. R. Evid. 702.

Vaquera testified at the Rule 702 hearing that he was employed by TDCJ as an STG coordinator; that he supervised 27 gang officers throughout the region; that he reviewed packets submitted by gang-intelligence officers and made determinations whether information was “good to concur or not concur” with gang-intelligence conclusions about prisoners’ gang membership; and that this information would then be submitted to Huntsville for confirmation.

Vaquera testified he had worked as a gang-intelligence officer and in the STG coordinator’s office for over thirteen years. He said he attended roughly 400 hours of training on gang intelligence provided by TDCJ in Huntsville and additional training provided by other state agencies. He explained courses on recognizing tattoos, slang, and codes used by STG’s. He testified he had been promoted to STG coordinator in 2003 and had taught courses in prison-gang identification. He said he had testified previously as a prison-gang expert.

Vaquera described criteria and a process used within TDCJ for determining gang membership. He testified that he personally reviewed photographs of tattoos on Garza’s body and also viewed Garza’s body to verify the photographs were accurate. He reviewed the STG file prepared on Garza, including correspondence between Garza and known TS members. He described distinguishing characteristics of Garza’s tattoos that he identified as signifying TS membership.

Vaquera acknowledged his knowledge was not the product of academic training or the subject of an academic discipline. At the end of the hearing, defense counsel objected to Vaquera being designated as an expert witness. The objection included the following statement: "I'm going to object to the officer offering an expert opinion because he does not meet the requirements of Rule 702. The basis for his conclusions are nothing more than a recitation of his observations of matters that can be presented to the jury for their own conclusion. And he demonstrates no special academic knowledge and no special training or experience outside of on-the-job training that would qualify him more so than a juror to draw a conclusion concerning gang membership. And we object for that reason."

The Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Vaquera to testify as an expert regarding prison gangs, citing Vaquera’s years of professional experience and hundreds of hours of training in prison gang intelligence and identification.

Constitutional challenge not preserved (Point of error eight)

Garza argued that admitting Vaquera’s expert testimony violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article 1, section 19 of the Texas Constitution, and he argued the testimony was generalized and unreliable. The Court held error was not preserved because Garza did not object at trial that admission violated the federal or state constitutions.

Garza’s points of error seven and eight were overruled.

Punishment-phase issues

Right of allocution / statement of remorse (Point of error twelve)

Garza argued the trial court violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by denying his request for a statement of allocution not subject to cross-examination. He asked to express remorse to the victim’s family in the presence of the jury without being subject to cross-examination.

The Court held there was no constitutional right recognized by the United States Supreme Court or Texas appellate decisions to present mitigating evidence free from cross-examination before punishment had been assessed. It overruled point of error twelve.

The trial court asked Garza whether he had anything to say before sentence was pronounced, and Garza stated that he did not.

Jury instructions: vote and life-sentence outcome (Point of error eleven)

Garza argued that failure to instruct the jury that one juror’s vote would result in life sentence, despite statutory requirements for ten votes for a “no” answer on future dangerousness or a “yes” answer on mitigation, violated the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court noted prior rejections of the arguments and overruled point of error eleven.

Jury instructions: reasonable doubt (Point of error thirteen)

Garza argued the trial court violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by denying a request to instruct each juror to determine his or her own personal definition of reasonable doubt. The Court held the requested instruction was not required by Texas law or federal law and that the jury charge already included instructions explaining the role of “reasonable doubt” in the special issues and other admonitions.

The Court overruled point of error thirteen.

Jury instructions: good-conduct time and parole eligibility (Point of error ten)

Garza argued the trial court erred by overruling his objection to the jury instruction regarding possibility of reducing a life sentence through good-conduct time and/or parole. The Court described the parole eligibility language given to the jury: that if sentenced to life imprisonment, Garza would not become eligible for parole until actual calendar time served equaled forty calendar years, without consideration of good conduct time, and that eligibility did not guarantee parole would be granted.

The Court addressed that the good-conduct-time language was erroneous in the context described, and it analyzed harm. The Court concluded inclusion of the parole-eligibility instruction caused no egregious harm even if erroneous, and the inclusion of the good-conduct-time instruction, though erroneous, was harmless. It overruled point of error ten.

Execution protocol (Point of error fourteen)

Garza contended that Texas’s execution protocol violated the Eighth Amendment. He argued the execution protocol was inconsistently administered and used chemicals banned for euthanizing animals.

The Court held the claim was not ripe because his execution was not imminent, and it overruled point of error fourteen.

Outcome

The Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and sentence of death.

Other details

Parties and counsel identifiers

Prosecutor(s): Jennifer Basett. Defense lawyer(s): unknown.

Prior and post-conviction posture

Garza was convicted in April 2000 of capital murder committed on December 31, 1998 and sentenced to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed on direct appeal in Garza v. State, No. AP-73,850, and later denied relief on Garza’s Article 11.071 application in Ex parte Garza, No. WR-56,961-01. After federal habeas relief vacated the death sentence for ineffective assistance of counsel failing to obtain and use mitigating evidence at punishment, the case returned for a new punishment hearing, and the trial court again imposed the death sentence on April 24, 2006.

Court and composition details

The opinion was delivered by Meyers, J., with Keller, P.J., and Price, Keasler, Hervey, Holcomb, and Cochran, JJ., joining. Womack and Johnson, JJ., concurred.