Jack Alfred Bennett

Case overview

Jack Alfred Bennett was convicted of murdering his wife and sentenced to death. He was later granted habeas corpus relief, which overturned his conviction and death sentence and ordered a new trial. On further appellate review, the decision was remanded to determine whether defense counsel were ineffective in presenting Dr. Harris’ testimony once his incompetence became apparent, in failing to seek a continuance to procure the assistance of another expert, for the remainder of the guilt/innocence and penalty phases of the trial, and for any other claims asserted but not considered.

Timeline

• June 24, 1989 — Bennett and his wife married.
• Four days after the marriage — Bennett killed his wife while she was sleeping; he stabbed her more than 100 times and caved in the left side of her head with a claw hammer.
• 1990 — Bennett was sentenced to death.
• 1992 — The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Bennett’s conviction and death sentence in Bennett v. State, 262 Ga. 149 (414 SE2d 218).
• 1992 — The United States Supreme Court denied Bennett’s petition for certiorari in Bennett v. Georgia, 506 U. S. 957 (113 SC 416, 121 LE2d 340).
• 1993 — A habeas corpus decision appears under the citation “S98A1993.”
• 1995 — A cross-appeal appears under the citation “S98X1995.”
• 1998 — The case was decided on March 1, 1998.
• Six months later — Dr. Boaz Harris died; his death followed the trial, and the cause of death was viral encephalopathy.

The offence

Bennett was described as having been married to his wife for only four days when he killed her. As she lay sleeping, Bennett stabbed her more than 100 times and caved in the left side of her head with a claw hammer. The State theorized that Bennett killed his wife in a jealous rage. Bennett turned himself in to police and admitted that he killed his wife. He claimed that his wife and another were plotting to kill him and that he killed her in self-defense.

Background

Until the murder, Bennett was described as having led a peaceful life. Bennett was 62 years old at the time of the murder and 68 at the time of being sentenced to death. Bennett was gainfully employed at a job he held for twenty years. He had no record of crime or violence. Bennett was described as the father of four daughters.

Investigation and arrest

Bennett turned himself in to the police and freely admitted that he killed his wife.

Trial

Trial counsel included Kenneth Krontz and Jennifer McLeod, who had been retained by Bennett. Based on Bennett’s claim and his apparent instability, trial counsel concluded that they needed a psychiatrist to explore an insanity defense. In a previous case calling for psychiatric assistance, counsel had used Dr. Boaz Harris. Counsel decided to procure Dr. Harris’ services again, and Dr. Harris met with Bennett several times after his arrest.

Dr. Harris concluded that Bennett was legally insane when he killed his wife. His diagnosis was that Bennett was suffering from a temporary psychotic episode. Dr. Harris informed defense counsel of his diagnosis and added that numerous stress factors led to Bennett’s mental breakdown. Dr. Harris also told counsel that Zantac, a medication prescribed for Bennett, was an “important” contributing factor.

Defense counsel met with Dr. Harris several times. The last meeting took place nine months before trial. Although other meetings were arranged before trial began, Dr. Harris begged off. Defense counsel spoke with Dr. Harris by telephone three months before trial. They had a brief telephone conversation with him the day before he was to testify. Defense counsel thought his testimony was a “done deal.”

On the day Dr. Harris testified, a Friday, Dr. Harris arrived in the courtroom looking “deathly ill.” He was accompanied by a companion who drove him and assisted him in moving about. Dr. Harris was to testify in the afternoon as Bennett’s last witness. Before testifying, Dr. Harris rested on a couch in defense counsel’s office for three hours, but his condition did not improve. When defense counsel suggested a continuance until Monday, Dr. Harris balked and said he would “withdraw” if he did not testify that afternoon. He assured defense counsel he was prepared and able to testify.

On the witness stand, Dr. Harris was described as far from the expert witness counsel had known him to be. His clothes were described as disheveled, unkempt, and sloppy. His testimony was described as the worst defense counsel had ever seen. He was said to have confused names and appeared to be irrational; his voice was described as fluctuating inappropriately; and his facial expressions were described as “cartoonish.” Dr. Harris did testify on direct examination that, at the time in question, Bennett had had a temporary psychotic episode and that he did not know right from wrong.

The testimony on direct examination “stunned” defense counsel when Dr. Harris “pooh poohed” the notion that Zantac was an important contributing factor in Bennett’s psychosis. On cross-examination, Dr. Harris’ response to several questions was to sit speechless, and he was described as distracted by crime scene photos. He continued to be confused and rambling.

When the prosecutor asked Dr. Harris what he would do for Bennett to prevent him from killing again, Dr. Harris replied:

“I'd give him Tylenol as needed for his headache and I'd tell him to take -- to stay on Zantac for his hiatal hernia . . . [and] I'd send him home with follow-up care.”

The reply evoked laughter in the courtroom and the jury box. Dr. Harris then volunteered additional damaging testimony after the prosecutor finished cross-examining him. The colloquy was:

Prosecutor: Thank you Dr. Harris.
Dr. Harris: Would it be appropriate for me to make one more comment?
Prosecutor: . . . If you want to volunteer something, tell the jury whatever you want them to hear; I'm sure they'll listen.
Dr. Harris: This [pointing at a crime scene photograph] looks like the work of a vicious maniac.
Prosecutor: Thank you Doctor. You know who did that, don't you, Dr. Harris?
Dr. Harris: Mr. Bennett.

After Dr. Harris testified, Krontz apologized to Bennett. Krontz believed that Dr. Harris had “gutted” the insanity defense and destroyed the credibility of the entire defense team. Although Dr. Harris’ “expert” testimony was described as the lynchpin of Bennett’s insanity defense, defense counsel made no reference to it in closing argument.

After Dr. Harris testified, defense counsel learned through Dr. Harris’ companion that Dr. Harris was suffering from AIDS. Defense counsel subsequently learned that, at the time of trial, Dr. Harris had AIDS dementia. Defense counsel realized Dr. Harris had deceived them with regard to his ability to testify on Bennett’s behalf.

Defense counsel put forth no mitigating psychiatric evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. Counsel requested a charge on Bennett’s lack of future dangerousness, but introduced no evidence along those lines because they feared calling Dr. Harris back to the stand. As a result, the trial court refused to give a lack of future dangerousness charge.

Sentencing

Bennett was sentenced to death in Douglas County for killing his 55-year-old wife four days after they were married on June 24, 1989.

Appeals

Bennett filed a habeas corpus petition alleging denial of his right to effective assistance of a mental health expert as well as his right to effective assistance of counsel.

At the habeas corpus hearing, Bennett presented testimony from Krontz and McLeod and from Dr. Charles Barnett Nemeroff, chairman of the Department of Psychiatry at Emory University Medical School. Dr. Nemeroff testified that, at the time of the murder, Bennett suffered a brief reactive psychosis and, possibly, an acute delusional paranoid disorder. Dr. Nemeroff testified that Zantac was one of a number of factors which could have contributed to Bennett’s breakdown, and that it was unlikely that the murder was the result of a jealous rage. Dr. Nemeroff also testified that Dr. Harris’ performance at trial was “not in any way, shape or form competent.”

The habeas corpus court found Bennett was deprived of his due process right to a fair trial because the testimony of his psychiatric expert completely undermined his insanity defense. Accordingly, the habeas corpus court granted Bennett’s petition, overturned Bennett’s conviction and death sentence, and ordered a new trial. The habeas corpus court also concluded that defense counsel could not be faulted for putting Dr. Harris on the witness stand without interviewing him.

The State appealed in Case No. S98A1993. Bennett cross-appealed in Case No. S98X1995, asserting primarily that the habeas corpus court erred in failing to find ineffectiveness of trial counsel.

On appeal, the court addressed whether a defendant had a right to effective assistance of an expert witness distinct from the right to effective assistance of counsel, answering in the negative. The court noted that, under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68 (105 SC 1087, 84 LE2d 53) (1985), the due process clause ensures access to a competent psychiatrist when a defendant’s mental state is in issue, but did not establish a right to effective assistance of a psychiatrist or other expert. The court cited Waye v. Murray, 884 F2d 765 (4th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) and described Waye as rejecting an ineffective-psychiatrist claim. The appellate discussion cited other agreements with Waye, including Wilson v. Greene, 155 F3d 396, 401 (4th Cir. 1998); Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F2d 1497, 1517-1518 (9th Cir. 1990); Silagy v. Peters, 905 F2d 986, 1013 (7th Cir. 1990); and People v. Samayoa, 938 P2d 2, 31 (Cal. 1997).

The appellate court stated that the habeas corpus court erred by awarding habeas corpus relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of an expert witness. The appellate court then addressed the cross-appeal and stated that, although a defendant was not entitled to effective assistance of an expert witness, a remedy existed when an expert witness was ineffective, framed as ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court cited Poyner v. Murray, 964 F2d 1404, 1419 (4th Cir. 1992) and explained that constitutionally deficient performance must be that of counsel in obtaining psychiatric examinations or presenting evidence at trial, for example. The court applied the two-pronged test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

Bennett claimed trial counsel performance was deficient in several ways, including failure to: (1) interview Dr. Harris and ascertain his mental fitness before putting him on the stand; (2) alert the trial court that Dr. Harris was incompetent; (3) request a continuance of the guilt-innocence phase to secure other psychiatric expert assistance; and (4) request a continuance of the sentencing phase for the same purpose.

The appellate discussion noted that, because the habeas corpus court had vacated Bennett’s conviction and sentence, it saw no need to consider each claim but had addressed Bennett’s first claim by finding defense counsel were not ineffective for failing to interview Dr. Harris before he testified. The habeas corpus court determined defense counsel reasonably believed Dr. Harris’ testimony was set based on a telephone conversation with Dr. Harris three months before trial and Dr. Harris’ assurances at the time of trial that he was prepared and capable. The appellate court stated that the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct must be viewed at the time of trial and under the circumstances of the case, citing Berry v. State, 267 Ga. 476, 479 (4) (480 SE2d 32) (1997), and Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 783 (1) (325 SE2d 362) (1985) for the irrelevance of hindsight and the strong presumption of reasonable professional conduct.

The appellate court concluded that evidence supported the conclusion that defense counsel acted reasonably when they put Dr. Harris on the witness stand without interviewing him further. The appellate court cited Henry v. State, 269 Ga. 851, 855 (5) (507 SE2d 419) (1998).

However, the appellate court concluded defense counsel did not act reasonably in failing to seek a continuance once Dr. Harris began testifying, because at that point it became apparent that despite prior assurances, Dr. Harris was manifestly incapable of assisting the defense. The appellate court quoted from Clisby v. Jones, 960 F2d 925, 934, fn. 12 (11th Cir. 1992):

“[W]e have difficulty envisioning a case in which counsel's failure to alert the trial court to the manifest inadequacy of an expert's psychiatric assistance would not violate the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.”

The appellate court remanded to the habeas corpus court to determine whether defense counsel were ineffective in presenting Dr. Harris’ testimony once it became apparent that he was incompetent, failing to seek a continuance to procure assistance of another expert for the remainder of guilt/innocence and penalty phases, and any other claims asserted but not considered.

The appellate court also addressed discovery matters and stated it would not reverse a trial court’s decision on discovery matters without clear abuse of discretion, citing Woelper v. Piedmont Cotton Mills, 266 Ga. 472, 473 (1) (467 SE2d 517) (1996). The appellate court found no clear abuse of discretion in the habeas corpus court’s refusal to permit discovery of Dr. Harris’ medical records.

Outcome

Bennett’s conviction and death sentence were overturned on habeas corpus, and a new trial was ordered. On further appellate review, the decision included a remand to determine whether defense counsel were ineffective in presenting Dr. Harris’ testimony after it became apparent that Dr. Harris was incompetent, in failing to seek continuances to obtain another expert for the guilt/innocence and penalty phases, and for any other claims asserted but not considered. The appellate decision was decided on March 1, 1998.

Other details

During the trial-related events, Bennett’s wife was described as 55 years old. Bennett stabbed his wife more than 100 times and caved in the left side of her head with a claw hammer.

Counsel and parties named in the habeas corpus proceeding included Kenneth Krontz and Jennifer McLeod for Bennett. The named representatives included Stephen S. Cowen, Douglas W. Gilfillan, James W. Boswell III, Michael M. Raiber for appellee, and David McDade, District Attorney; Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General; Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Christopher L. Phillips, Assistant Attorney General for appellant.

Dr. Boaz Harris was described as a graduate of Yale University School of Medicine and as the founder of Charter Peachford Hospital in Atlanta. Dr. Harris diagnosed Bennett as legally insane when he killed his wife and testified about a temporary psychotic episode and inability to know right from wrong.

Dr. Charles Barnett Nemeroff testified about reactive psychosis, possible acute delusional paranoid disorder, Zantac as a potential contributing factor, and that it was unlikely the murder resulted from jealous rage.

After testifying, defense counsel learned Dr. Harris suffered from AIDS and that he had AIDS dementia at the time of trial. Dr. Harris closed his office shortly before trial and died six months later; the cause of death was viral encephalopathy.