Cindy Lou Landress

Case record: Cindy Lou Landress

Parties

• Cindy Lou Landress — appellant/defendant
• Leonard Fowler — victim, found dead in his home
• Lewellen — co-participant in the robbery; found in possession of the butterfly knife at the time he was arrested
• Julie — Lewellen’s daughter; witness who testified about events before the killing
• Richard J. Conroy — Lake County Superior Court Judge
• William Lewellen — referenced in the dissent as a participant in the robbery and attacker
• James F. Stanton — counsel for appellant
• Linley E. Pearson — Attorney General; for appellee
• Arthur Thaddeus Perry — Deputy Attorney General; for appellee
• KRAHULIK, Justice — author of the majority opinion
• SHEPARD, C.J., and DeBRULER and DICKSON, JJ. — concurring
• GIVAN, J. — dissenting; separate opinion

Timeline

• Early hours of April 23, 1988 — Landress and Lewellen were driven to Lewellen’s parents’ home by Lewellen’s daughter, Julie; Landress showed a buck knife after Lewellen showed a butterfly knife; Julie stopped the car near Leonard Fowler’s home and Landress and Lewellen got out.
• About nine o’clock in the morning on April 23 — Landress testified she was awakened by Fowler when Lewellen arrived at the home where Landress was living at the time.
• About two weeks later — Landress and Lewellen captured in California after making their way to California.
• May 15, 1989 — trial began; the State moved to dismiss the count charging a knowing or intentional murder.
• October 15, 1992 — counsel listed in the direct appeal materials.
• 1992 — direct appeal under Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(A)(7) and Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(h) resulted in the death penalty sentence being vacated and remand for imposition of a new sentence.
• 1994 — after resentencing and imposition of 60 years imprisonment, direct appeal affirmed.

Background

Cindy Lou Landress was convicted by a jury of “felony murder” under Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2) in connection with the death of Leonard Fowler during a robbery. The jury also recommended the death penalty. Landress was sentenced to death pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9.

Landress later raised issues challenging the imposition of the death penalty. The appeal was a direct appeal pursuant to Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(A)(7) and Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(h). Landress did not challenge the jury’s determination of guilt.

The offence

Count I charged murder in the perpetration of a robbery (felony murder), Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2). Count II sought the death penalty for Landress’ participation in an intentional killing during a robbery pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(G).

During the guilt phase, the State instructed the jury that Landress was criminally responsible for the actions of Lewellen, described as actions which were a probable and natural consequence of their common plan even though not intended as part of the original plan.

During the penalty phase, the burden of proof required the State to prove that Landress had the intent to kill under Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(G), and her confederate’s intent could not be imputed to her.

Investigation

• A knife missing from the kitchen was identified by Fowler’s daughter as a blade recovered at the crime scene.
• Fowler’s death cause was multiple stab wounds to his abdomen which severed a large artery, causing him to bleed to death.
• One knife blade separated from the handle and two knives were recovered at the crime scene.
• Fowler’s daughter identified the blade as having belonged to a knife missing from the kitchen.
• Fowler’s blood was identified on this blade.
• Human blood was found on the blade of the buck knife, but the police were unable to determine whose blood was present.
• There was an indication that blood was present on the other knife, but it could not be identified.

Arrest / capture

• Lewellen was found in possession of the butterfly knife at the time he was arrested.
• Landress testified that after leaving Fowler’s home in his truck, she and Lewellen made their way to California and were captured there approximately two weeks later.
• In the dissent, it was stated that Landress had a cut on her hand at the time of her arrest.

Trial

Charges and amendment

• Landress was originally charged with a knowing or intentional murder under Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).
• The information was amended in December, 1988 by addition of a count seeking the death penalty pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9 for an intentional killing during a robbery.
• In February 1989, a count for felony murder under Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2) was added.
• On May 15, 1989, the day trial began, the State moved to dismiss the count charging a knowing or intentional murder, leaving only the felony murder charge in the guilt phase.

Jury findings and sentencing recommendation

• Landress was convicted of felony murder.
• The jury recommended the death penalty.
• The trial court sentenced Landress to death pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9.
• The jury was reconvened to consider a recommendation of death after the guilt phase.

Evidence and testimony

Julie testified that when Lewellen returned to the car from the house, he showed Julie and Landress a butterfly knife. Landress said:

• “That's nothing, look at this,” and showed them a buck knife. Landress indicated that she and Lewellen planned to go “rolling”. Julie understood “rolling” to mean that they were going to knock someone out and take that person’s money.

On instructions from Landress, Julie stopped the car near Leonard Fowler’s home where Landress and Lewellen got out. Landress told Julie not to tell anyone what she had seen or heard that evening.

Landress testified that after being dropped off, she proceeded to Fowler’s home where she was living at the time. She testified that she was awakened by Fowler at about nine o’clock in the morning on April 23 when Lewellen arrived. Landress got out of bed and began talking and drinking with Lewellen and Fowler in the kitchen.

Landress testified that Lewellen suddenly threatened Fowler with a knife and forced Fowler to lie face down on the floor. Following Lewellen’s instructions, Landress brought an extension cord and suspenders, which Lewellen used to tie up Fowler. Landress testified that Lewellen removed Fowler’s wallet and handed it to Landress; she went into the kitchen with the wallet, removed the money, and urged Lewellen to leave the house with her.

Landress testified that at that point she observed that Fowler had escaped and was in his bedroom loading his shotgun. When she told Lewellen of this development, he ran to the bedroom and began stabbing Fowler. Landress attempted to break up the fight but was unable to do so. Landress obtained a knife from the kitchen and returned to the bedroom. She testified that she did not rejoin the struggle but dropped the knife in the doorway. Her intent was to stop the fight between the two men.

Landress testified that at some point she received a deep cut to the palm of her hand. Lewellen then announced that Fowler was dead and instructed Landress to take the keys to Fowler’s truck. Landress removed the keys from a front pocket of Fowler’s pants, and the two left Fowler’s home in his truck.

Sentencing

• Code § 35-50-2-9** after the jury recommended the death penalty.
• The Indiana Supreme Court vacated the death sentence and remanded “for imposition of a new sentence.”
• After remand, Lake County Superior Court Judge Richard J. Conroy resentenced Landress to 60 years imprisonment.
• The subsequent direct appeal after resentencing and imposition of 60 years imprisonment resulted in affirmation.

Appeals

Direct appeal: issue regarding intent to kill for death penalty

Landress presented issues challenging the imposition of the death penalty but did not challenge guilt. The court held that one issue was dispositive and concluded that the evidence was insufficient to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Landress had the intent to kill required to impose the death penalty.

The court explained that:

• On review of sufficiency, it did not reweigh evidence or determine witness credibility, and it looked to the evidence most favorable to the verdict.
• During the penalty phase, the State was required to prove intent to kill, and confederate intent could not be imputed.

The majority discussed Enmund v. Florida (1982) and Resnover v. State (1984), emphasizing individualized consideration for imposing a death sentence. The majority reasoned that, although imputation for felony murder was proper during guilt, the focus during penalty must be on Landress’ participation and culpability.

Majority holding on intent to kill

The majority concluded:

• Intent to kill need not be established by direct evidence; circumstantial evidence could be sufficient.
• Landress’ statement the night before the killing that she and Lewellen were going “rolling” evidenced intent to rob, not to kill.
• Landress testified denying intent to kill and denying she stabbed Fowler.
• The physical evidence was consistent with her testimony in that the fatal stab wound was inflicted from the front.
• The court found no direct evidence that Landress inflicted a mortal wound or used the knife in a manner likely to cause great bodily injury or death.
• The court held the death penalty could not be applied where intent to kill was inferred solely and wholly upon another inference, and therefore the State failed to meet its burden beyond a reasonable doubt that Landress intended to kill.

The court then vacated the death penalty sentence and remanded for imposition of a new sentence, stating:

• Accordingly, the death penalty sentence is vacated and this matter is remanded for imposition of a new sentence.

Separate opinion (dissent)

GIVAN, J. dissented and argued that the majority should not set aside the death penalty. The dissent stated that:

• By the appellant’s own statements, she and William Lewellen intended to rob the victim.
• She aided Lewellen in tying up the victim and helped in the endeavor.
• After the victim was tied up and while the robbery was still in progress, the victim escaped, went into his bedroom to obtain a shotgun, and was attempting to load it.
• The appellant alerted Lewellen to this fact and Lewellen attacked the victim before the shotgun could be loaded.
• The appellant went to the kitchen and obtained a butcher knife.
• The victim died of multiple stab wounds.
• The butcher knife was found at the scene with human blood on it, but technicians were unable to type the blood.
• The appellant had a cut on her hand at the time of her arrest.
• The dissent asserted that the jury could disbelieve the appellant’s testimony that she went to the kitchen and obtained the butcher knife to separate the men from fighting.
• The dissent stated there was no question from the appellant’s own testimony as to whose side she was on when the fight erupted.
• The dissent stated there was ample evidence from which the jury could determine beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant and Lewellen engaged in a joint enterprise of robbery and, when the victim placed himself in a threatening position, the robbers joined in an attack resulting in his death.
• The dissent argued the inference of intent to kill could be based on inferences from the evidence and cited Buckner v. State (1969) and Shutt v. State (1953).
• The dissent addressed Enmund v. Florida (1982) and stated that the factual situation in the case at bar was different from Enmund because the jury could deduce appellant joined the attack with the butcher knife, entitling the jury to find intent to kill from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death, citing Concepcion v. State (1991).

The dissent concluded:

• I would affirm the trial court in all respects.

Outcome

• The Indiana Supreme Court vacated the death penalty sentence and remanded for imposition of a new sentence.
• After remand, Landress was resentenced to 60 years imprisonment in compliance with an Indiana Supreme Court opinion setting aside the death sentence and remanding “for imposition of a new sentence.”
• The direct appeal after resentencing and imposition of 60 years imprisonment was affirmed. Landress v. State, 638 N.E.2d 787 (Ind. 1994).

Other details

• The case included references to Ind. Appellate Rule 17 and emphasized careful examination in death penalty cases.
• The majority explained a legal principle regarding inferential proof: “an essential element of an offense necessary in the proof of the offense and to sustain a verdict of guilty may not be proved by an inference which is founded solely and wholly upon another inference.” The majority cited Smith v. State (1928), 200 Ind. 411, 414, 164 N.E. 268, 269.
• The majority also cited Corbin v. State (1990) for intent and circumstantial evidence, and referenced rules for drawing inferences from use of a deadly weapon.