Henry Curtis Jackson

Case record: Henry Curtis Jackson

Background

Henry Curtis Jackson, Jr. was convicted in the Leflore County Circuit Court in 1991 of capital murder and sentenced to death for the stabbing deaths of four children, his nieces and nephews. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.

Jackson filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief in the Circuit Court of Leflore County and an application for leave to file motion to vacate conviction and/or death sentence, which were before the Supreme Court of Mississippi. His petition and application were denied.

The offence

Jackson murdered four children, two of his nieces and two of his nephews, in an attempt to steal money kept in his mother’s safe in her home.

On the evening of November 1, 1990, Jackson’s mother, Martha, and four of her older grandchildren went to church. Martha’s daughter, Regina Jackson, stayed home with her two daughters, five-year-old Dominique and two-year-old Shunterica, whom Jackson murdered that night, and four other of their nieces and nephews, three-year-old Antonio whom Jackson murdered and two-year-old Andrew whom Jackson murdered. Eleven-year-old Sarah and one-year-old Andrea were severely injured during these murders but survived.

While Regina and the children were at the house watching television, Jackson parked his car two blocks away, walked to the house, and cut the outside telephone line. He knocked on the door and was allowed inside. Inside, he picked up the phone and indicated it was not working. Regina headed to a neighbor’s house to place a call to check the phone. Before going very far, Jackson told Sarah to call Regina back. Regina came back in and, followed by her daughter Shunterica, sought Jackson in the kitchen.

Jackson told Regina to take Shunterica back into the television room. She did so and upon her return to the kitchen Jackson grabbed her from behind. With one hand around her neck and one around her waist, he walked her down the hall to the boys’ room. He asked for her paycheck. Regina told him she had no money. Jackson then asked for the combination to his mother’s safe. When Regina said she did not know it, he pulled out knives and shoved them into her throat and waist.

Regina yelled for eleven-year-old Sarah, who came running and jumped on Jackson’s back. The three struggled, during which Jackson told her that he had to kill them. Sarah begged him to just get the safe and leave.

Meanwhile, the smaller children had followed Sarah down the hall, and Jackson called them into the room where they obediently remained. He then took Regina into an adjacent room and tried to open the footlocker where he believed the combination to the safe was kept.

Jackson then began stabbing Sarah in the neck, then took Regina and Sarah into the boys’ room where he tried to tie them up. Regina, who had already been stabbed several times, picked up some iron rods that Jackson had brought in from the bathroom, and started hitting him with them. Jackson then went and picked up the baby, one-year-old Andrea, and used her as a shield. Regina relinquished the rods and let him tie her up with a belt. He stabbed her again in the neck.

While Regina watched, Jackson picked up her daughter, two-year-old Shunterica, by the hair, stabbed her, killed her, and laid her on a bed.

While Regina and Sarah were struggling to stay alive, Jackson started dragging the safe down the hall which awakened five-year-old Dominique. Dominique came down the hall calling for her mother, at which time, as Regina testified, Jackson told Dominique that he loved her, but then stabbed her, killed her, and threw her on the floor. After killing Dominique, Jackson walked over to Regina and again shoved a knife in her neck. Regina then pretended she was dead.

Sarah tried to comfort her baby sister, Andrea, and told three-year-old Antonio to run for help. Jackson called Antonio back. Regina had fainted by this time and Jackson was trying to wake her up. He then grabbed Sarah again and began stabbing her in the neck. After the knife broke off in her neck, he ran to the kitchen, retrieved another knife, stabbed her again and threw her on a bed. Sarah then pretended she was dead. She heard Antonio yelling for help and saw Jackson kneeling over him.

While Sarah did not actually see Jackson stabbing him, she testified: “I saw his hand moving when he was over him. I didn't see but I knew he was doing something cause my little brother was hollering.” She likewise did not witness the stabbing of two-year-old Andrew, but when she saw him, “[h]e was on the bottom of the bed and his eyes were bulging and his mouth was wide open.”

Sarah was able to jump from the bed and escape out the front door. She hid behind a tree across the street and watched as Jackson came outside, looked around, and went back inside.

Upon Jackson’s last view of the room, Regina and Andrea appeared dead, and the four children—five-year-old Dominique, three-year-old Antonio, two-year-old Shunterica, and two-year-old Andrew—were all dead.

Shortly after the murders, Angelo Geens, Martha Jackson’s cousin and neighbor, returned to his home at about 8:30 p.m. Sarah ran to him from where she had been hiding and told him that Regina and the others were in the house and that her uncle Jackson had killed them all. Geens carried her into his house and called the police and an ambulance.

Investigation

Deputy Sheriff J.B. Henry and Deputies Tindall, Berdin, and Fondren arrived at the scene and discovered the bodies of the four children. Leflore County Coroner James R. Hankins pronounced the four children dead at the scene. From the house, the bodies of Shunterica, Dominique, Andrew, and Antonio were sent to the Deputy State Medical Examiner for forensic pathology examinations.

Jackson had become the subject of an extensive manhunt. While still at the Jackson residence, Deputy Sheriff Tindall received a call from the Highway Patrol regarding a wrecked car in Eupora just fifty yards from the site where the Eupora Police Department had been conducting a routine license check. The car was a 1977 green Monte Carlo. The car bore a license tag registered to Martha Jackson’s 1973 brown Ford station wagon. A wallet containing Jackson’s identification was found on the front console, and Jackson’s own license tag as well as a long, dark trench coat were found in the trunk.

Jackson abandoned the car when he saw the roadblock and took off a foot. Eluding police, Jackson jumped a train from Eupora to West Point.

Arrest

On Monday morning, November 5, 1990, Jackson turned himself in to the West Point Police Department. Jackson gave a statement to Leflore County Sheriff Ricky Banks, who had been summoned to West Point. Jackson stated that, knowing his mother would be at church, he had gone to her house to get the safe because he needed more money to pay his bills. He had brought a kitchen knife with him that was in the car and when he heard someone in the house, went around the back to cut the telephone line. After stabbing Regina and the children, he tried to move the safe and to find a second safe she had mentioned. Noticing lights at the house across the street, he then climbed out the bathroom window and fled to his car.

Trial

Jackson was indicted on four counts of capital murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of armed robbery on March 12, 1991, by a grand jury of the Leflore County Circuit Court.

Under counts one through four, Jackson was charged with the deaths of two-year-old Shunterica, five-year-old Dominique, three-year-old Antonio, and two-year-old Andrew. In each count, Jackson was charged with killing while engaged in the commission of the crime of felonious abuse and/or battery of a child in violation of Section 97-5-39(2), Mississippi Code Annotated of 1972, as amended, or in any attempt to commit such felony; in violation of Section 97-3-19(2), Mississippi Code Annotated of 1972, as amended.

Counts five and six charged Jackson with the armed robbery of Regina Jackson and with “unlawfully, wilfully, feloniously and purposely caus[ing] bodily injury to Regina Jackson, a human being, by stabbing said Regina Jackson with a deadly weapon, to wit: a knife.”

Under Count seven, Jackson was likewise charged with the stabbing of Sarah.

Jackson was arraigned on April 29, 1991, and entered pleas of not guilty on all seven counts.

Trial was set for August 26, 1991. During voir dire, Jackson’s attorney and the court questioned jurors regarding their exposure to media coverage of the murders, especially during the days immediately before the trial. Based on the responses, the court advised Jackson’s attorney that if he sought a change of venue it would be considered.

On August 29, 1991, the court entered an order changing venue to Copiah County and setting the trial for September 9, 1991. The Copiah County jury found Jackson guilty on all seven counts and sentenced him to death on each of the four capital murder counts.

On direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed Jackson’s conviction and sentence.

Sentencing

Jackson was sentenced to death on each of the four capital murder counts by the Copiah County jury.

Post-conviction and appeals

Jackson raised twenty alleged violations of his federal and state constitutional rights in his petition and application. The petition and application were denied.

The Supreme Court discussed the standards under the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act and procedural bars including waiver and res judicata. The Court addressed multiple grounds for relief.

Manslaughter instruction

Jackson claimed he was entitled to a manslaughter instruction. The Court noted that the claim was raised on direct appeal in two separate propositions and decided adversely. The Court held the claim was res judicata and could not be relitigated. Jackson argued that Kolberg v. State, 704 So.2d 1307 (Miss.1997), was an intervening decision allowing relitigation. The Court concluded Kolberg did not announce a new rule of law that would adversely affect the conviction or sentence and that the present case was distinguishable. The Court also stated there was no evidence of manslaughter on which to base granting the instruction. Jackson’s claim on this ground was denied.

The Court discussed Jackson’s statement to police regarding planning the robbery believing his mother and the rest of the household would be at church, and that his attorney conceded the only evidence supporting a heat of passion manslaughter instruction was Jackson having gotten into a fight with Regina because she did not know the combination to the safe. The Court concluded there was no evidence that Jackson stabbed the baby or killed the children at that time. It also referenced the comment to Regina that he had come to kill them previously and was going to kill them that night.

Constitutionality of death sentence under Enmund and West

Jackson submitted that since the jury did not find that he “intended” to kill, he was not death eligible, arguing violations under Enmund v. Florida and West v. State, and violations of Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(7) (Rev.2000). The Court held the claim was barred for failure to raise at trial or on direct appeal and could not be raised for the first time absent cause and actual prejudice, and alternatively was without merit. The Court discussed Enmund’s requirements and Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(7).

The Court quoted Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(7)’s requirements for written findings by the jury: “In order to return and impose a sentence of death the jury must make a written finding of one or more of the following: (a) The defendant actually killed; (b) The defendant attempted to kill; (c) The defendant intended that a killing take place; (d) The defendant contemplated that lethal force would be employed.”

The Court discussed Jackson’s reliance on West v. State and concluded that neither Enmund nor § 99-19-101(7) nor the Court’s decisions required the jury to find that the defendant “intended” to kill in order to impose the death penalty upon a felony murder conviction. The Court denied relief on this ground.

Constitutionality of child abuse/battery death-eligibility scheme

Jackson claimed the Mississippi death penalty scheme and provisions relating to child abuse/battery capital murder were unconstitutional because they failed to narrow the death-eligible class. The Court noted the child abuse/battery capital murder statute language, including that death-eligibility applied when the killing was done with or without any design to effect death while engaged in commission of felonious abuse and/or battery of a child.

The Court held this claim was barred because it was not raised at trial or on direct appeal and could not be overcome with cause and actual prejudice. The Court also stated that the use of the underlying felony as an aggravating factor had been decided against Jackson on direct appeal and thus was barred as res judicata. Alternatively, the Court held the claim was without merit and denied relief.

Independent mental health evaluation / conflict of interest

Jackson claimed denial of an independent, conflict-free, reliable and competent mental health evaluation because Michael Whelan, Ph.D., was employed by the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) and had treated Jackson for depression previously. The Court held the claim was raised at trial and was granted relief with an additional mental evaluation, and was raised on direct appeal in the context of continuance; thus it was barred from relitigation under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(2). The Court also held there could be no error because the trial court granted relief on the conflict.

Alternatively, the Court held the claim was without merit, including that Jackson was not constitutionally entitled to effective assistance of an expert witness, and addressed Dr. Whelan’s competence. The Court also referenced Jackson’s affidavit of Dr. Chris Lott.

Compelled self-incrimination by examination

Jackson claimed he was compelled to incriminate himself by submitting to an examination by Dr. Whelan. The Court held the claim was barred because it was not raised at trial or on direct appeal and Jackson had not shown cause and actual prejudice. Alternatively, the Court held the claim was without merit, stating it was based on Dr. Whelan’s conclusion that Jackson’s story about how he ended up in Greenwood the night of the murders was a falsehood, and that Dr. Whelan’s conclusion was not based upon prior treatment but rather on victims’ statements and Jackson’s confession given to law enforcement. The Court denied relief.

Effective assistance on direct appeal/rehearing

Jackson claimed attorney C. Jackson Williams was ineffective in failing to point out that footnote four of the Supreme Court’s opinion on direct appeal was incorrect regarding Dr. Whelan’s employment and in failing to address that Jackson was in prison attire in front of the jury venire. The Court found no deficient performance and actual prejudice. It noted at trial Dr. Whelan testified that he worked for MDOC, and on direct appeal counsel challenged refusal to allow questioning regarding whether complaints stemmed from reluctance to cooperate with an MDOC employee. The Court denied relief.

Regarding prison attire, Jackson argued that prison attire precipitated a substantial danger of destruction of the presumption of innocence, citing Hickson v. State. The Court found no merit because Jackson’s attire consisted of ordinary navy pants and a blue chambray shirt. The Court said counsel objected at trial since clothing was provided by the Department of Corrections but was overruled because the clothing was not distinguishable from ordinary, everyday clothing. The Court also said the trial judge did not deny Jackson the opportunity to change clothing and recognized that no other clothing was available. The Court denied relief.

Mental health examinations and withdrawal of insanity defense / ineffective assistance

Jackson claimed trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain an independent, competent and reliable mental health evaluation earlier to substantiate that “brain-damage” led to the murders and attempted murders. The Court discussed Jackson’s reliance on language from the direct appeal opinion regarding the five-month timeframe to file a notice of insanity defense, objections to evaluations, and measures to secure evaluations.

The Court discussed the State’s position on August 21, 1991 regarding constitutional requirements for psychiatrists or psychologists and noted there was no suggestion of insanity. The Court stated Jackson did not raise an insanity defense; it was abandoned because he was unable to present evidence creating an M’Naghten question.

Jackson argued that effectiveness of counsel was interfered with when the trial court failed to appoint defense mental health experts or timely authorize funds to hire defense mental experts or grant a continuance. The Court discussed Ake v. Oklahoma, including: “[W]hen a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination ․ This is not to say, of course that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own. ”

The Court held Jackson was provided with court-appointed psychologists and psychiatrists according to constitutional standards, and that counsel could not force a physician to come to any particular conclusion. It held Jackson could not show deficient performance or prejudice and that the issue was procedurally barred, and alternatively without merit. The Court denied relief.

Mitigation evidence / ineffective assistance

Jackson claimed ineffective assistance in failing to develop and present evidence in mitigation of punishment. The Court stated the claim was without merit, noting trial counsel called seven mitigation witnesses, including Dr. Whelan and Jackson’s probation officer. The Court described testimony from those witnesses about Jackson’s self-elected choice to turn himself in, remorse, anger disorder, potential metabolic disorders, toxic disorders and traumatic brain injury, Jackson’s I.Q. being in the low eighties, intellectual slowness, and that before Jackson’s crime he did not have a persuasively criminal or antisocial personality.

The Court stated family members testified about their love for and forgiveness of Jackson, head injuries, and that something was mentally wrong with Jackson. It described testimony from Jackson’s sister (the mother of two of the murdered children) that she was hurt and angry, that Jackson should be punished but not put to death, and that she forgave him and still loved her brother. It described Jackson’s mother’s testimony about childhood head injuries related to sports and work and that Jackson was supportive financially, buying groceries and supplies, and that he should be punished but not sentenced to death. It described Dr. Summers’s testimony about head injuries, blackouts, major depression, intermittent explosive episodes of anger, complex partial-seizure disorder, and potential adverse pharmaceutical reactions.

The Court concluded it was not persuaded that additional witnesses would have changed the sentencing outcome and found no reasonable probability of a different result had other mitigation been presented. The Court denied relief.

Failure to object to comment on ultimate issue of law

Jackson claimed trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a comment on responsibility by Dr. Whelan during the State’s cross-examination. The Court quoted the exchange: “By Mr. Crook: If I am understanding your report to the Court and your testimony, his actions and emotions that you found to be present had nothing to do with his responsibility is that correct? A. Not in a legal sense, no. Neither you nor Mr. Walls has really asked me to explain my psychological testing and why that led him to do what he did. But in a legal sense, no. He is responsible for what he did. Q. Well, in mitigating factors, if I understand you correctly, are that his history prior to arrest is relatively stable, means he doesn't have any problems as far as- A. He is married for several years, three of four years and is raising a family, had his own children, had a steady job, that is what I mean by that. He wasn't going out and robbing stores and beating up people.”

The Court held counsel had already raised the underlying claim on direct appeal and it was barred for failure to object at the time, citing the direct appeal decision. The Court alternatively found no Strickland prejudice and denied relief.

Competency to stand trial / mental health

Jackson claimed he was too depressed to complete a neuropsychological screening test and therefore incompetent to assist his attorneys and incompetent to stand trial. The Court held it was barred because it was not raised at trial or on direct appeal. Alternatively, it held two experts examined him and Jackson was found competent to stand trial; one doctor found him not competent, but the doctor’s report did not mention incompetence for the application purposes. The Court held the reports of the two doctors found him competent were sufficient to overcome the claim on the merits and denied relief.

Right to be present / waiver

Jackson claimed he was denied his right to be present during trial and to confront witnesses, and also claimed the trial court should hold a hearing to determine whether he was competent to waive presence. The Court held the claims were barred because neither was raised at trial or on direct appeal.

Alternatively on the merits, the Court held the record reflected Jackson left the courtroom of his own free will each time. It stated he was competent to waive his right because his departures resulted from trial times during which evidence or testimony illustrating the damage he caused his victims was presented. The Court stated the trial court discussed the matter with Jackson and his counsel and allowed him to leave upon presentation of often gruesome evidence, and stated the trial court would instruct the jury that Jackson had the right to leave and no inference should be drawn from his absence.

The Court stated following the testimony of Officer Bowles, counsel reported Jackson was sick and vomiting. The court requested Jackson be brought into the courtroom to be questioned. Jackson said he had not eaten, did not need a doctor, and waived his presence. Counsel then moved to continue, which the court denied because Jackson had waived his presence.

The Court also stated the record showed Jackson voluntarily absented himself during the reading of portions of his confession, quoting the trial court: “BY THE COURT: The court watched him and he left voluntarily. I was looking at him. He left on Page 13 and 17. I noted it and put that in the record. And he has left several times. He has informed the Court that he wished to at certain points leave. The Court gave him that permission and told him that it was his absolute right to be there but I could not require him to be there.”

The Court held Jackson’s claims were without merit and denied relief.

Prosecutorial argument involving Bible / failure to object

Jackson claimed the prosecution made improper jury arguments based on the Bible and biblical teachings, including an argument that the jury should follow God’s law and quoting it as “extrajudicial authority,” engaging in an impermissible “misstatement of the law.” The Court noted no objection was raised at trial or on direct appeal, holding the claim barred by Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1).

The Court also held arguments with scriptural, religious or biblical references were proper subjects for comment during closing when responsive to defense counsel. It noted that defense counsel made religious-based arguments, and held Jackson’s ineffective-assistance claim for failing to object to biblical references was without merit.

Other prosecutorial misconduct / ineffective assistance

Jackson claimed prosecutorial comments violated his rights, including comments on his failure to take the stand and testify, an incorrect explanation of the nature of mitigation, misleading the jury about mitigating factors, personal opinion on the quality and credibility of defense witnesses during sentencing, and trial counsel’s ineffective assistance for failing to object to a statement that Jackson had been convicted of kidnaping.

The Court held these claims were barred because they had been barred on direct appeal for failure to object at trial. It stated that because the Court had decided these claims on direct appeal on the procedural bar, they were res judicata and could not be relitigated.

The Court further discussed Strickland for ineffective assistance and denied relief, including that on direct appeal it had addressed and found “no such allusions in the portions of the trial transcript cited by the appellant” regarding failure to testify. It discussed mitigation explanations, the prosecutor’s entitlement to rebut mitigating evidence, and claims about misstatements regarding prior convictions. It stated on direct appeal it noted charges had been dropped and a certified copy of a burglary conviction had gone to the jury; therefore any misstatement about kidnapping was not prejudicial. It also stated counsel had objected during cross-examination of Dr. Summers and the jury heard the objection and ruling.

Regarding credibility and forgiveness, the Court described the prosecutor’s questioning and quoted that the prosecutor stated: “questioned the sincerity of forgiveness.” The Court quoted the context as follows: “Counsel tells you that all of those mothers and family members forgive him. And, I think that's interesting, ladies and gentlemen, because they say they forgive him but they still think he should be punished. And I questioned the sincerity of that forgiveness. I know what Regina told you. She couldn't forgive everything he did. The family has some interesting explanations for why he did what he did ․”

The Court held this was not a personal opinion but referencing cross-examination and denied relief.

Sympathy instructions

Jackson claimed jury instructions regarding sympathy violated his rights and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object. The Court held the claim had been addressed on direct appeal in the context of failure to grant a mercy or sympathy instruction and found without merit, making it barred as res judicata.

Jackson argued King v. State was an intervening decision requiring relief. The Court held King was about reversible error for instructing the jury it was not to be swayed by sympathy in toto and that this Court had repeatedly held a jury may not be instructed to disregard sympathy in toto. The Court concluded the instruction in Jackson’s case did not instruct total disregard of sympathy and stated that instructions of this kind had been approved. The Court held the claim without merit.

It also held that defense argued Jackson deserved sympathy, and the prosecutor’s comments were rebuttal, with the Court noting it was appropriate for the state to argue against the death penalty based on legitimate considerations. The Court denied relief, stating the jury was not instructed to totally disregard sympathy.

Cumulative error

Jackson claimed cumulative trial errors could not be harmless. The Court held all of Jackson’s claims had already been litigated and could not be relitigated, and alternatively that they were without merit. It held Jackson had not raised a viable ineffective-assistance claim. The Court denied relief.

Outcome

Jackson’s petition for post-conviction relief and application for leave to file motion to vacate conviction and/or death sentence, as supplemented, were denied. The Supreme Court denied the petitions for post-conviction collateral relief.

Other details

The Supreme Court discussed procedural rules and standards, including waiver and res judicata under the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act and standards for ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington.

The Court discussed scheduling, venue change, and trial participation, including Jackson’s voluntary absences from the courtroom during portions of testimony and reading of parts of his confession.

The record described medical findings from autopsies and injuries:

• Dr. Steven Hayne testified that Shunterica suffered three stab wounds to the neck and two shoulder abrasions, with her jugular vein severed; Dr. Hayne opined she ultimately bled to death.
• Andrew sustained three stab wounds to the neck, with the first cut through the carotid artery and the jugular vein; Dr. Hayne opined that such an injury “would require a considerable amount of strength” and noted a pinpoint hemorrhage caused by force on the child’s neck.
• Dominique died of multiple stab wounds to the neck, including three of the four stab wounds cutting her jugular vein and trachea.
• Antonio suffered four stab wounds and two slash wounds which cut through his trachea; Dr. Hayne determined Antonio died from a stab wound that cut through his heart.
• Sarah underwent surgery for five serious stab wounds to her abdomen, chest, and neck, including a lacerated windpipe; Regina suffered five stab wounds to her neck.
• One-year-old Andrea suffered a single penetrating stab wound to her neck causing a tracheal injury and severely damaged her spinal cord; as a result, she was unable to walk and had no fine motor control in her arms.

The Court also referenced Mississippi’s forms of execution and the history of execution methods in Mississippi, including hanging, the electric chair, the gas chamber, and lethal injection, and included descriptions of Mississippi State Penitentiary operations and capacity. The Court listed the Superintendent and Deputy Commissioner of Institutions as E.L. Sparkman, and the employees and area wardens at the Mississippi State Penitentiary.