William Speer

Case identification

William Speer

Background

William Speer had a prior prison record of #668485: a life sentence from Harris County for 1 count of capital murder with a deadly weapon.

The offence

On 7/11/1997 at the Telford Unit in Bowie County, Speer strangled to death a 47 year old white offender in the victim's cell.

Other people involved

Co-defendants

Anibal Canales

Victim

The victim was described as a white male and was 47 years old.

Fellow inmate

Gary Dickerson was described as a fellow inmate who was murdered.

Investigation

The opinion described that Speer was suspected of committing the murder of fellow inmate Gary Dickerson.

Arrest

The opinion did not describe an arrest.

Trial

Appellate court and docket details

The case was heard in the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas as No. 74,253, with William Speer, Appellant v. The State of Texas.

Conviction

In October 2001, a jury convicted appellant of capital murder pursuant to Section 19.03(a)(6), Texas Penal Code, which makes it a capital offense for a person to knowingly or intentionally murder another person while the defendant is incarcerated in a penal institution for a separate murder or capital murder conviction.

Sentencing

Pursuant to the jury's answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071, §§ 2(b) and 2(e), the trial judge sentenced appellant to death under Art. 37.071, § 2(g).

Direct appeal

Direct appeal to this Court was automatic under Art. 37.071, § 2(h). Cochran, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

Points of error raised on direct appeal

Appellant raised two points of error: admission of evidence and speedy trial.

Admission of evidence

In his first point of error, appellant claimed that the trial court improperly permitted the State to introduce into evidence certain handwritten prison notes allegedly authored by appellant. Appellant claimed that the court erred in allowing the notes because they had not been properly authenticated.

Texas Rule of Evidence 901(a) was cited for the rule that authentication or identification of evidence is a condition precedent to admissibility. The opinion stated:

"is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."

The opinion described a method of proving authorship of a letter by non-expert opinion testimony as to handwriting genuineness under Tex. R. Evid. 901(b)(2), and stated that the opinion must be based upon familiarity with the handwriting that was not acquired for purposes of litigation.

The opinion stated that appellant technically conceded that the State met the language of the rule when it presented testimony of two inmate accomplices and other inmates who claimed to be familiar with appellant's handwriting and signature and who identified the writing in the notes as appellant's.

Appellant argued that the trial judge abused discretion in gatekeeping when he accepted the testimony despite unreliability concerns. Appellant stated that the trial court:

"accept[ed] the word of the criminals in this case"

and appellant asserted that testimony given by criminals is:

"inherently unreliable."

Appellant also stated that the trial judge:

"seems to have been more concerned about whether the prosecutor asked the right question rather than whether the persons answering were credible and disinterested enough to give reliable answers."

The opinion explained that there was no “best witness” rule requiring only those witnesses deemed credible and sufficiently disinterested. It stated that witness competency was for the judge, while credibility was for the jury, and that:

"It is the jury that is the lie detector in the courtroom."

The opinion also stated that although appellant argued the inmate witnesses lacked credibility, appellant called an inmate witness at trial who testified he was familiar with appellant's handwriting and identified the handwriting in the complained-of notes as appellant's. The opinion stated that this witness attempted to persuade the jury that although the notes were written by appellant, the substance of the notes was subterfuge.

The opinion stated that trial courts have broad discretion in evidentiary rulings and are usually best positioned to determine whether evidence should be admitted or excluded, and held that because appellant’s argument rested on credibility of witnesses, deference was appropriate and there was no abuse of discretion in determining the notes were sufficiently authenticated for jury consideration.

Point of error one was overruled.

Speedy trial

In his second point of error, appellant claimed that he was denied a speedy trial as required by Article 28.061 and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Appellant argued specifically that he did not receive a speedy indictment, meaning he was not indicted within the time frame set out in Article 32.01, and that therefore the charges should have been dismissed and the State should not have been allowed to retry him.

Dates of consequence described in the opinion

• July 11, 1997 — Fellow inmate Gary Dickerson was murdered.
• September 14, 1997 — Appellant, who was in prison serving a life sentence for capital murder, was removed from the general population and placed in administrative segregation in part because he was suspected of committing the murder.
• November 4, 1999 — Appellant was indicted for capital murder.
• March 31, 2000 — Counsel was appointed for appellant on the capital murder charge.
• August 20, 2001 — Counsel filed a motion to dismiss the prosecution for "Lack of [a] Speedy Trial."
• August 23, XXXX — A pre-trial hearing was held and the motion was denied.
• October 15, 2001 — Voir dire began in appellant's capital murder trial.

Administrative segregation description for the speedy trial argument

Appellant argued that the period between when he was placed in administrative segregation and when he was indicted required dismissal. Appellant described that in administrative segregation he was in solitary confinement, had only one hour a day of solitary recreation, and was shackled and escorted by guards when he left his cell. Appellant asserted his indictment should be set aside under Articles 28.061 and 32.01 because he was not timely indicted.

The opinion explained that prior to May 1997, Article 28.061 provided a bar to further prosecution of an offense that had been discharged due to the State's failure to indict within Article 32.01 time limits. The opinion stated that effective May 26, 1997 (before the commission of the instant offense), the Legislature deleted language in the statute referring to a discharge under Article 32.01, and that the effect was that the State was no longer barred from prosecuting even if it failed to timely indict.

The opinion also explained that Article 32.01 applied when a defendant had been detained in custody or held to bail for appearance to answer a criminal accusation before the district court, and discussed that the statute prevented citizens from being held in jail or on bail without being indicted. The opinion stated that this concern did not exist when a defendant was already incarcerated on convictions for other offenses.

Appellant’s argument that he was detained in custody under Article 32.01 when placed in administrative segregation for the suspected murder of Dickerson was addressed by the opinion. The opinion explained that prison authorities placed appellant in administrative segregation for disciplinary purposes, not because law enforcement authorities had detained him on a criminal accusation before a district court. It stated that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice was responsible for internal disciplinary procedures with regard to prisoners and courts did not control internal actions. The opinion described that an inmate placed in administrative segregation may be placed there for several reasons including safety and may never be formally charged.

The opinion concluded that the mere fact appellant was placed in administrative segregation did not mean he was detained to answer a criminal accusation before the district court in a way that triggered Article 32.01, and therefore rejected the speedy trial claim.

Point of error two was overruled.

Conclusion of the appellate decision

The opinion stated that it affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Delivered: October 8, 2003

En banc Do Not Publish

Outcome

The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.

Timeline

• 07/11/1997 — Fellow inmate Gary Dickerson was murdered; Speer strangled to death a 47 year old white offender in the victim's cell at the Telford Unit in Bowie County.
• 09/14/1997 — Speer, serving a life sentence for capital murder, was removed from general population and placed in administrative segregation in part because he was suspected of committing the murder.
• 11/04/1999 — Speer was indicted for capital murder.
• 03/31/2000 — Counsel was appointed for Speer on the capital murder charge.
• 08/20/2001 — Counsel filed a motion to dismiss the prosecution for "Lack of [a] Speedy Trial."
• 10/15/2001 — Voir dire began in Speer’s capital murder trial.
• 10/30/2001 — The jury convicted in October 2001 and the trial judge sentenced appellant to death (the status field recorded this date as sentencing to death).
• 02/01/1991 — The status field recorded that Speer was sentenced to life in prison.
• 10/08/2003 — Delivered: October 8, 2003 (en banc).

Sentencing

The trial judge sentenced appellant to death pursuant to the jury's answers to the special issues under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071, §§ 2(b) and 2(e), with the sentence under Art. 37.071, § 2(g).

Appeals

Direct appeal was automatic under Art. 37.071, § 2(h).

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Both points of error were overruled (admission of evidence and speedy trial).

Other details

Statutory text included in the opinion

The opinion quoted Article 32.01:

When a defendant has been detained in custody or held to bail for his appearance to answer any criminal accusation before the district court, the prosecution, unless otherwise ordered by the court, for good cause shown, supported by affidavit, shall be dismissed and the bail discharged, if indictment or information be not presented against such defendant on or before the last day of the next term of the court which is held after his commitment or admission to bail or on or before the 180 th day after the date of commitment or admission to bail, whichever date is later.

The opinion also included a quotation reference about the pre-1997 version of Article 28.061:

If a motion to set aside an indictment, information, or complaint for failure to provide a speedy trial is sustained, the court shall discharge the defendant. A discharge under this article or Article 32.01 of this code is a bar to any further prosecution for the offense discharged and for any other offense arising out of the same transaction, other than an offense of a higher grade that the attorney representing the state and prosecuting the offense that was discharged does not have the primary duty to prosecute.

Motion terminology and hearing outcome

Counsel filed a motion to dismiss the prosecution for "Lack of [a] Speedy Trial." A pre-trial hearing was held and the motion was denied.

Recorded biographical and custody details in the case summary

• Speer’s date of birth was 09/29/1974.
• Speer’s date received was 10/30/2001, with age (when received) listed as 27 and education level listed as 8.
• Speer’s date of offense was 07/11/1997, with age at the offense listed as 23.
• County was Bowie.
• Race was listed as white; gender was male; hair color was black; eye color was brown; height was 6 ft 0 in; weight was 215.
• Native county and state were listed as Harris, Texas.
• Prior occupation was Harris Texas laborer.
• Prior prison record was #668485 - life sentence from Harris County for 1 count of capital murder with a deadly weapon.