James Montell Chappell

Case overview

James Montell Chappell was sentenced to death on March 20, 2007, after a District Court jury sentenced him to death for the 1995 first-degree murder of his girlfriend, Deborah Panos.

Chappell had previously been sentenced to death in an earlier trial. The state Supreme Court brought the case back to life in April after finding Chappell had ineffective counsel during the penalty hearing of his first trial and striking most of the aggravating circumstances prosecutors had originally brought in seeking a death verdict. His original conviction on the first-degree murder charge stood.

Chappell told the court: "I'm profoundly and sincerely sorry and remorseful about the whole situation," and his Deputy Special Public Defender Clark Patrick said he was disappointed with the verdict. Patrick hoped the circumstances of Chappell's childhood would sway jurors toward a life term.

Background

Chappell’s mother died, his father was out of the picture, and he had been raised by an abusive grandmother in a poor Michigan neighborhood, according to the defense. Chappell became addicted to drugs at 13.

Chappell and Panos had a tumultuous 10-year relationship. He had been arrested numerous times for beating her both in Tucson and Las Vegas, according to witnesses.

The offence

On the morning of August 31, 1995, James Montell Chappell was mistakenly released from prison in Las Vegas where he had been serving time since June 1995 for domestic battery. After his release, Chappell went to the Ballerina Mobile Home Park in Las Vegas where his ex-girlfriend, Deborah Panos, lived with their three children.

Chappell entered Panos' trailer by climbing through the window. Panos was home alone, and she and Chappell engaged in sexual intercourse.

Sometime later that morning, Chappell repeatedly stabbed Panos with a kitchen knife, killing her. Chappell then left the trailer park in Panos' car and drove to a nearby housing complex.

Prior to trial, Chappell offered to stipulate that he (1) entered Panos' trailer home through a window, (2) engaged in sexual intercourse with Panos, (3) caused Panos' death by stabbing her with a kitchen knife, and (4) was jealous of Panos giving and receiving attention from other men. The State accepted the stipulations.

Prosecutors argued in the new sentencing phase that Chappell raped Panos, who was trying to leave him before he killed her, and that the sexual assault warranted the most severe sentence.

Investigation and pre-trial proceedings

The State filed an information on October 11, 1995, charging Chappell with one count of burglary, one count of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and one count of murder with the use of a deadly weapon.

On November 8, 1995, the State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. The notice listed four aggravating circumstances:

1. the murder was committed during the commission of or an attempt to commit any robbery;
2. the murder was committed during the commission of or an attempt to commit any burglary and/or home invasion;
3. the murder was committed during the commission of or an attempt to commit any sexual assault; and
4. the murder involved torture or depravity of mind.

The notice and penalty phase arguments were later affected by the state Supreme Court’s decision in April after ineffective counsel was found during the penalty hearing of Chappell’s first trial and most aggravating circumstances were struck.

Chappell was released from jail in August 1995 after being arrested weeks earlier for holding a knife to Panos' throat, prosecutors said. He was supposed to report to a drug treatment center but instead walked to Panos' trailer, and prosecutors said he ransacked her home and found a letter from another lover. When Panos returned home and found him there that day, prosecutors said he raped and beat her and stabbed her more than a dozen times.

Arrest and custody

Chappell had been serving time for domestic battery in Las Vegas. On the morning of August 31, 1995, he was mistakenly released from prison.

Trial

The case proceeded to trial on October 7, 1996.

Chappell took the witness stand on his own behalf and testified that he considered the trailer to be his home and that he had entered through the trailer's window because he had lost his key and did not know that Panos was at home. He testified that Panos greeted him as he entered the trailer and that they had consensual sexual intercourse.

Chappell testified that he left with Panos to pick up their children from day care and discovered in the car a love letter addressed to Panos. He testified that he was enraged, dragged Panos back into the trailer, and stabbed her to death. Chappell argued that his actions were the result of a jealous rage.

The jury convicted Chappell of all charges.

Admission of evidence of prior bad acts (appeal discussion)

Chappell contended that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of prior acts of theft without holding a Petrocelli hearing.

LaDonna Jackson testified that Chappell was known as a "regulator" and that, on one occasion, he sold his children's diapers for drug money. Ordinarily, a Petrocelli hearing must have been conducted on the record.

The appellate discussion stated that, in the instant case, the district court did not hold a Petrocelli hearing either on or off the record. The court concluded that the record was not sufficient to determine admissibility under the test for admissibility of bad acts evidence, but held that the error was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt and did not require reversal.

Sentencing

Following a penalty hearing, the jury returned a sentence of death on the murder charge, finding two mitigating circumstances: (1) murder committed while Chappell was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and (2) "any other mitigating circumstances"—and all four alleged aggravating circumstances.

The district court sentenced Chappell to:

• a minimum of forty-eight months and a maximum of 120 months for burglary;
• a minimum of seventy-two months and a maximum of 180 months for robbery, plus an equal and consecutive sentence for the use of a deadly weapon; and
• death for the count of murder in the first degree with the use of a deadly weapon.

The district court ordered all counts to run consecutively.

In the new sentencing phase, the jury read the new verdict, and the verdict was described as the second time a jury determined that James Chappell should be executed for the 1995 slaying of Deborah Panos.

Chappell told the court on Tuesday: "I'm profoundly and sincerely sorry and remorseful about the whole situation," and Deputy Special Public Defender Clark Patrick said he was disappointed with the verdict.

In the sentencing phase reporting, Patrick said about Chappell’s childhood: "The house he grew up in is condemned. I just think his circumstances would have warranted something" besides the death penalty.

Victim impact

Panos' family members were moved to tears during testimony in the new sentencing phase.

Her mother, Norma Penfield, 70, had been raising the three children, who were now teenagers, in Tucson, Ariz.

Norma Penfield said: "One sad thing is you can't be a grandmother. You have to be the parent."

Panos’ sister Carol Monson held hands and cried as the jury read the new verdict, and they embraced Chris Owens after the hearing. Monson said they waited last year to hear from the state about Chappell's execution date and said: "Instead what do we hear: He's getting a new hearing. I was just blown apart," and: "You want to believe in the law and in the legal system. It just seems like the criminals get second chances and third chances, but how many chances did Debbie get?"

Appeals

Supreme Court decision discussed

The case was appealed and addressed by the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada in a decision referenced as 114 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 148.

The Supreme Court decision entry included:

• "December 30, 1998"
• "Appeal from a judgment of conviction pursuant to a jury verdict of one count each of burglary, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, and from a sentence of death."
• "Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; A. William Maupin, Judge."
• "Affirmed."
• The recusal notes stated that "The Honorable Charles E. Springer, Chief Justice, voluntarily recused himself from participation in the decision of this appeal" and that "The Honorable A. William Maupin, Justice, voluntarily recused himself from participation in the decision of this appeal."

In the Nevada Supreme Court discussion:

• Chappell argued that insufficient evidence existed to support the jury’s finding of four aggravating circumstances.
• The court concluded that sufficient evidence supported aggravating circumstances for robbery, burglary, and sexual assault, and concluded that the evidence did not support the aggravating circumstance of torture or depravity of mind.
• The court held that invalidating an aggravating circumstance did not automatically require vacating the death sentence and remanding for new proceedings before a jury, because at least one other aggravator existed.
• The court concluded that the remaining three aggravators—robbery, burglary, and sexual assault—clearly outweighed the mitigating evidence presented.

The Nevada Supreme Court also addressed issues including:

1. peremptory challenges alleged as discriminatory toward two African-American jurors from the jury pool;
2. hearsay statements;
3. a motion to strike the notice of intent to seek the death penalty;
4. alleged improper appeal to the jury for vengeance during the penalty phase;
5. cumulative error; and
6. victim impact testimony.

The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that these issues lacked merit.

Robbery aggravator analysis

Chappell argued the evidence showed he took Panos' car as an afterthought and therefore could not be guilty of robbery.

The State argued that a rational trier of fact could find that Chappell took Panos' social security card and car through the use of actual violence or the threat of violence.

The analysis set out Nevada’s definition of robbery and discussed the concept that timing of intent to steal could be irrelevant in robbery cases. It concluded there was sufficient evidence to support robbery and the finding of robbery as an aggravating circumstance.

Burglary aggravator analysis

Chappell argued insufficient evidence existed to prove burglary.

The analysis cited Nevada law describing burglary as entering a semitrailer or house trailer with intent to commit grand or petit larceny, assault or battery on any person or any felony. It concluded there was sufficient evidence supporting the conviction of burglary and the jury’s finding of burglary as an aggravator, including evidence that Panos wanted to end her relationship with Chappell, that Chappell had threatened and abused Panos in the past, that Panos did not communicate with Chappell while he was in jail, that the trailer appeared ransacked, and that Panos' social security card and car keys were found in Chappell's possession.

Sexual assault aggravator analysis

Chappell argued the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual encounter was nonconsensual.

The analysis stated that the jury was instructed to find sexual assault if Chappell engaged in sexual intercourse with Panos "against [her] will" or under conditions in which Chappell knew or should have known that Panos was "mentally and emotionally incapable of resisting."

It concluded that, given the abusive relationship, Panos ending her relationship, Chappell’s extreme jealousy, and Panos’s involvement with another man at the time of the killing, a rational trier of fact could conclude consent would not occur under these circumstances or that Panos was mentally or emotionally incapable of resisting, supporting sexual assault as an aggravating circumstance.

Torture or depravity of mind aggravator analysis

Chappell argued the circumstances did not rise to the level necessary to establish torture or depravity of mind.

The analysis concluded the record did not contain sufficient evidence to support the aggravating circumstance of depravity of mind and torture. It discussed that Panos died as a result of multiple stab wounds and then analyzed intent to cause cruel pain and suffering for revenge, persuasion, or other sadistic purposes, concluding that there was no evidence Chappell stabbed Panos with any intention other than to deprive her of life.

It also concluded that stabbing her thirteen times did not rise to the level of torture.

Outcome

The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction for robbery, burglary, and first-degree murder, and the sentence of death.

In the later proceedings described in the sentencing report, the state Supreme Court had brought the case back to life in April after finding ineffective counsel during the penalty hearing of Chappell’s first trial and striking most of the aggravating circumstances prosecutors originally brought seeking a death verdict, while his original conviction on the first-degree murder charge stood. After that, a District Court jury sentenced Chappell to death again, and he was sentenced to death on March 20, 2007.

Other details

• The notice of intent to seek the death penalty on November 8, 1995, listed four aggravating circumstances including torture or depravity of mind.
• The appellate discussion referenced "Petrocelli v. State, 101 Nev. 46, 692 P.2d 503 (1985)."
• The appellate discussion included a footnote defining that Jackson testified that a "regulator" is a person who steals items from a store and then resells those items for money or drugs.
• The appellate discussion referenced a change to NRS 200.033(8) in 1995 deleting language of "depravity of mind," and stated that because the murder occurred before October 1, 1995, the previous version applied.
• The appellate discussion noted that on the presentation of first-degree murder by torture, instructions were approved in "Deutscher v. State, 95 Nev. 669, 677 n.5, 601 P.2d 407, 413 n.5 (1979)" and cited NRS 200.030(1)(a).
• The district court and appellate decision addressed mandatory review under NRS 177.055(2).
• The report of sentencing described prosecutors as Chris Owens and Pam Weckerly, and defense as Clark Patrick (Deputy Special Public Defender).