Raymond Riles

Background

Raymond Riles was an inmate from Houston who had been on death row for more than 30 years. His case had sparked a debate about what to do with inmates spending decades waiting for an execution. In a television interview from death row at the Polunsky Unit in Livingston, Raymond Riles said: "They told me they were going to kill me unless I stopped preaching my mystic gospel," and he also said: "God is the greatest and I didn't come to die on death row." He stated: "They're trying to silence me because I know about the satanic secret societies of the TDC shadow government e-system," and he also said he believed God committed his crime, believed he was chosen to release men from death row, and believed a lethal injection would not kill him.

In the interview, Raymond Riles blamed God for his prison suicide attempt in 1985. He set himself on fire in his cell, and he said: "God did that," and "God consumed me in fire."

Raymond Riles’ sister, Helen Riles, spoke from her Houston home about Raymond Riles’ three decades on death row, describing it as "bittersweet." She said: "I don't think he could ever come all the way back," and "I really don't. But he would able to feel more comfortable and get more rehabilitation." She also said: "As long as he's living, I'm still living," and "We're still living." Helen Riles stated: "I don't think he could ever come all the way back," and later said: "I'm not just going to let him sit there and not fight for him,".

The offence

Raymond Riles committed his crime in 1974. The federal appellate court record stated that on December 11, 1974, Riles robbed and shot thirty-one year-old John Thomas Henry, and that two days later Henry died and Riles was charged with his murder. The conviction was for capital murder, and it was connected to the robbery.

Investigation

The federal appellate opinion stated that Raymond Riles was scheduled to be executed on September 17, 1986 for a murder he committed in 1974.

Trial

Raymond Riles was tried before a jury, convicted of capital murder, and sentenced to death. The Harris County jury sentenced Riles to death.

Upon appeal, the conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. The federal appellate opinion cited Riles v. State, 557 S.W.2d 95, 99 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) as the reversal and remand.

The second trial also resulted in Riles’ conviction for capital murder, and punishment again was death. State, 595 S.W.2d 858 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) (en banc) as the result after the second trial.

Jury selection and venire exclusions

In the federal appeal, Riles complained about the state trial court’s decision to exclude for cause two veniremembers because of their views on capital punishment.

One excluded veniremember admitted that his deliberations would be influenced by a possible death sentence and that, given a choice, he would choose a sentence other than death. The other excluded veniremember, Ms. Simpson, unequivocally stated that she could not impose capital punishment for a murder that occurred during the course of an armed robbery, and that anything short of a brutal "butcher" of a victim would result in her answering the special verdicts in such a way as to defeat a penalty of death.

Riles contended that the standards for exclusion should be applied under Adams v. Texas and Witherspoon v. Illinois rather than Wainwright v. Witt. The federal appellate court stated that the argument was unpersuasive and held that Witt clarified Witherspoon and reaffirmed Adams as the proper standard.

The federal appellate opinion quoted the veniremember Mr. Nix during colloquy:

COURT: Let me ask it this way: Would the fact that you know that the death penalty is a possibility in the event of a finding of guilty of capital murder, would the fact that you now know that that is a possibility, would that affect your deliberation on any issue of fact throughout the case? Do you understand my question?
MR. NIX: I understand it, but it is not that easy to answer.
COURT: No, I know it is not easy. But it is just like this: On the one hand, you tell me that you have this religious scruple against the infliction of death as punishment for crime. So, what I am asking you is, if that is the case, would the fact that the death penalty is a possibility affect the way you would answer any question involved in this lawsuit, up to and including, let's say, on the guilt or innocence--might you find it murder instead of capital murder so you wouldn't be faced with the death penalty?
MR. NIX: I am afraid I would have to say it would influence my way of thinking.
COURT: And that is true regardless of the nature and character of the case? Regardless of how bad the case is?
MR. NIX: Yes, I think so. It would still be in my mind, that it, that it would be to me, I would think I am doing wrong if I commit the guy.
COURT: We accept your feelings. Nobody is arguing with you. The only reason I am asking it in so many different ways is I must be absolutely sure that under no circumstances could you participate in a death penalty. If you had the choice, you would choose something less than death?
MR. NIX: I think I would have to say yes.

The federal appellate opinion also quoted the relevant voir dire of Ms. Simpson:

COURT: If both of those questions are answered yes by the jury, that is a mandate to me to give him the death penalty. If either of those questions is answered no, this is a mandate to me to give him life in the penitentiary. Since you have expressed your opposition to the death penalty as a punishment, I need to ask you this: If the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that each of these questions that I have just cited to you should be answered yes, could you and would you answer them yes, knowing that it would result in the death penalty? A. No.
COURT: You would be more than likely to answer one of them no, so it would be life imprisonment as opposed to the death penalty; is that correct statement? A. Yes, sir.
COURT: And this is, I assume, true regardless of the crime that might be involved? In other words, a bloody and brutal crime is involved, would your answer still be the same? A. No, I think I could change my mind then.
COURT: All right. Then you are not opposed to the death penalty? A. Well, it depends, then, I guess on the facts. COURT: Nothing unusual about that. So, if the facts were sufficient in your mind, you could vote for the death penalty; is that correct or not? A. I think it depends on the type of crime. A. Yes, exactly what the defendant did.
COURT: Well, how about a murder committed during the course of a robbery? That is exactly what we are talking about. A. If he cut her up or something of that nature.
COURT: You are talking about butchering here? A. Yes, sir.
COURT: And are you saying that in a case of--let's put it where it is a him. All right you are saying that in a case of murder during the course of a robbery, that unless somebody is butchered up, you could not find the death penalty; is that what you are telling me? A. Yes.
COURT: Regardless of any other facts? A. Yes.
COURT: Let me ask it another way. Not that you know the death penalty is a possibility and that mandatory life or death is an absolute proposition in the event of a finding of guilty of capital murder, would that fact affect your deliberations on any issue of fact during the course of the trial?
A. I think it would.

Voir dire examination issue

Riles alleged that the voir dire examination was conducted in a manner that reduced the State’s burden of proof on the punishment issue. Specifically, Riles alleged that the trial court stressed the proof needed to support the aggravating circumstances and disregarded the effect of possible mitigating evidence, thereby committing jurors in advance to return affirmative answers on two punishment issues. The federal appellate court stated that because Riles failed to object timely during voir dire and because counsel was given an opportunity to conduct his own examination, federal habeas review was denied on this issue. The federal appellate court agreed with the district court and held the challenge was waived.

Sentencing

The jury sentenced Raymond Riles to death. The punishment again was death after the second trial.

In the context of punishment issues, the federal appellate court identified these issues as:

1. whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result; and
2. whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society, with reference to Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071(b)(1) & (2) (Vernon Supp.1986).

In the televised interview, Roe Wilson, an assistant district attorney for Harris County, stated: "It's because he's incompetent to be executed," and further said: "If you don't meet the standard, then you cannot be legally executed,". Wilson also said: "That really is not a factor in this case," and: "What the factor is, is that (Riles) was competent when he was tried and given a legal sentence. His confinement is still legal and he simply has a condition right now that makes him not eligible for execution. But that could change." Wilson also said: "As long as he's living, I'm still living," which was attributed to Helen Riles, and Wilson said: "That really is not a factor in this case,".

Mental health and competency for execution

Mental health experts ruled that Raymond Riles did not understand why his execution was imminent or understand why he was being executed, and that he was mentally incompetent to be executed under the standard of the U.S. Supreme Court. In the interview, Wilson stated: "If you don't meet the standard, then you cannot be legally executed,".

In the interview, Raymond Riles believed God committed his crime and believed he was chosen to release men from death row, and he believed lethal injection would not kill him. The televised report described his mind as mixed-up, full of delusions and paranoia.

Appeals

Federal appellate proceedings

The federal appellate record included Raymond G. Riles, Petitioner-appellant, v. O. I. McCotter, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, respondent-appellee in the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. The federal appellate opinion was dated Sept. 10, 1986 and was an appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

The panel included RUBIN, JOHNSON and JONES, Circuit Judges, and the opinion was by EDITH HOLLAN JONES, Circuit Judge.

The petitioner, Raymond G. Riles, was scheduled to be executed on September 17, 1986. The opinion stated that having had his motions for a certificate of probable cause to appeal and stay of execution denied by the district court, Riles moved the appellate court for the same relief.

The appellate court found that there had been no substantial showing by Riles of a denial of a federal right and denied the motion for a certificate of probable cause. Accordingly, the motion for a stay of execution was denied and the appeal was dismissed.

The federal appellate opinion addressed multiple asserted grounds of error:

Exclusion of veniremembers due to views on capital punishment

The court addressed Riles’ challenge to exclusion for cause of two veniremembers. It concluded that Riles failed to make a "substantial showing of the denial of [a] federal right" with respect to this issue.

Voir dire examination

The court held that failure to object timely waived the voir dire challenge and agreed there was no substantial showing of the denial of a federal right as a result of the state trial court’s voir dire examination.

Instructions on mitigating circumstances and constitutionality of Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071

Riles argued that even if psychiatric evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convince the jury he was insane at the time of the murder, it may have been sufficient to show he was mentally ill and therefore a mitigating factor. He also argued that the trial court erred by failing to bring this to the jury’s attention during the penalty phase.

The appellate court discussed that a defendant would be barred from raising a claim about the absence of a mitigating circumstance instruction if no request was made or if no contemporaneous objection was raised, citing O’Bryan v. Estelle and Wainwright v. Sykes and referenced Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 36.14 and 36.15 (Vernon Supp.1986).

The court also discussed Riles’ constitutional challenge to Article 37.071, stating that it had previously been found in compliance with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, citing Granviel v. Estelle, and that the Texas statute had withstood constitutional attack in the Supreme Court, citing Jurek v. Texas. The court stated: "By authorizing the defense to bring before the jury at the separate sentencing hearing whatever mitigating circumstances relating to the individual defendant can be adduced, Texas has ensured that the sentencing jury will have adequate guidance to enable it to perform its sentencing function." It stated that the trial court instructed the jury that they could consider all evidence submitted during both phases when answering the penalty issues.

Fifth and Sixth Amendment issues related to psychiatric examination

Riles argued his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments were abridged under Estelle v. Smith because state medical experts interviewed him absent counsel, he was not advised of his right to remain silent, and he was not informed that the results could be used against him. The district court applied procedural default. The appellate court stated it had been brought to its attention that Texas courts waived procedural default theory in some post-Smith cases, citing Ex Parte Chambers, but it held Riles’ claim did not fit Smith analysis and that Riles did not show cause to overcome procedural default.

The appellate court distinguished the case from Smith, stating that Riles’ counsel requested most of the psychiatric examinations, and that unlike Smith, Riles raised the insanity defense so the state had the right to rebut that defense. It stated that by pursuing that defense and offering psychiatric evidence, Riles opened the door to the state’s evidence and waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, citing Vardas v. Estelle. It stated that there was no constitutional right to have an attorney present during the psychiatric examination, citing Vardas and United States v. Cohen.

State’s expert testimony during guilt/innocence phase

Riles objected to state expert testimony during the guilt/innocence phase. The federal appellate opinion stated that the state experts described characteristics of a sociopath and one expert testified that "this man is an extremely dangerous person who is a threat to society." Riles argued this contributed to the penalty-phase finding that he would constitute a continuing threat to society under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071(b)(2).

The appellate court stated that the state was free to offer an "alternative diagnosis" for behavior when an insanity defense was raised and that offering an alternate diagnosis allowed the state to demonstrate the defendant’s behavior conformed with the alternate diagnosis by offering a description of the disorder, citing Vardas.

Ineffective assistance of counsel

Riles alleged ineffective assistance of counsel during all stages of trial and on appeal, including voir dire, guilt/innocence, punishment phase, and appeal. He alleged his attorneys neglected to: raise on direct appeal improper exclusion of veniremembers; object to improper and prejudicial voir dire; and object to the introduction of psychiatric evidence admitted in violation of Estelle v. Smith.

The appellate court stated that the alleged omissions involved procedural defaults at trial or on appeal and that habeas relief would be denied absent good cause for default and actual resulting prejudice, citing Wainwright v. Sykes and Murray v. Carrier. It quoted Murray v. Carrier for the proposition that mere failure by counsel to recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim does not constitute cause for procedural default. It discussed that constitutionally ineffective counsel could constitute cause for procedural default and applied the two-part standard from Strickland v. Washington. It stated it had found each contention asserted by Riles to be meritless irrespective of procedural default and therefore could not find incompetence of counsel. It also found no error in denying an evidentiary hearing because a hearing was not required if it would not produce further evidence in support of specific, nonconclusory allegations, citing Celestine v. Blackburn.

The appellate court concluded there was no showing of a denial of a federal right entitling Riles to a certificate of probable cause to appeal, so it denied the petition and denied the motion for a stay of execution and dismissed the appeal.

Concurring opinions

Circuit Judge RUBIN concurred, stating: "I concur in the opinion because, as a judge of an inferior court, I am bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, and, as a judge of this court, I am bound by the law of this circuit." He said: "If I were free to do so, I would order an evidentiary hearing on the effectiveness of counsel." He also stated:

To me, a sufficient showing has been made that trial counsel did not provide this accused with the quality of defense essential to adequate representation in any serious felony case, and particularly in a capital case.

He stated it was probably true that any error made in the guilt-innocence phase was harmless in the sense that it did not appear likely to have affected the result, but he stated:

The briefs and argument of current counsel, however, together with the record, indicate that, if Riles ' trial counsel had been able, the jury might not have imposed the death penalty.

He then stated:

Precedent requires me to agree that this is not enough to justify a certificate of probable cause.

He further stated:

The Constitution, as interpreted by the courts, does not require that the accused, even in a capital case, be represented by able or effective counsel. It requires representation only by a lawyer who is not ineffective under the standard set by Strickland v. Washington.

He said:

Proof that the lawyer was ineffective requires proof not only that the lawyer bungled but also that his errors likely affected the result.

He concluded:

Ineffectiveness is not measured against the standards set by good lawyers but by the average--"reasonableness under prevailing professional norms"--and "judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly differential."
Consequently, accused persons who are represented by "not-legally-ineffective" lawyers may be condemned to die when the same accused, if represented by effective counsel, would receive at least the clemency of a life sentence.

Circuit Judge JOHNSON also concurred with the opinion and with the concurrence of Circuit Judge RUBIN.

Additional update about scheduling

The television interview stated that in 1986 Riles was inches from the death chamber in Huntsville and just minutes from execution when a federal court issued a last-minute stay. It stated this was the fourth time the state scheduled Riles’ execution. It stated that a new date had not been scheduled for the past 22 years.

Outcome

Raymond Riles remained on death row without an execution date at the time of the televised interview. The interview described him as remaining on death row at age 58, with 33 years and counting.

A Harris County assistant district attorney, Roe Wilson, stated that Texas law did not allow a death sentence to be replaced by a life sentence, and that Riles’ punishment stood no matter what his mental state was now.

The television interview stated that mental health experts had ruled Riles did not understand why his execution was imminent or understand exactly why he was being executed, and that made him mentally incompetent.

Aftermath

Helen Riles continued fighting to get her brother off of death row and into a mental health facility instead.

In a televised segment, Kristin Houle’ of the Texas Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty argued that the state’s confinement conditions gave inmates little access to psychiatric care and called it cruel and unusual punishment for the mentally ill. Houle’ said: "It makes no sense for the state to keep someone on death row under severe conditions, when he's been recognized as severely ill," and she stated that on death row inmates spent 23 hours a day in their cell.

Roe Wilson disagreed, stating: "That really is not a factor in this case," and that confinement was still legal and eligibility for execution was the issue.

The television report also stated that courts and doctors had ruled five other death row inmates from Harris County mentally incompetent to be executed. It stated that those inmates were tested periodically and that if ruled competent at any time, an execution date could be scheduled.

An update after the story aired included contact from the murder victim John Henry’s son. The report stated that due to the more than 30 years since the crime was committed, Local 2 Investigates was unable to locate any family member of Henry, and that the son’s email was provided below. The email stated:

"As the only child of John Henry, I have grown accustomed to Houston news channels running Raymond Riles' story at least once every decade since his crime. I grow more disgusted with our penal and judicial system every time his story airs. In a cowardly action, Riles shot my father in the back of the head and left him to die. This never would have been possible, except that our court system paroled him early from a prior conviction. Riles is nothing more than a career criminal and yet HIS story is the one that news agencies deem worthy of reporting. "Your stories only breed sympathy for people who have participated in horrendous crimes. Whether Riles is mentally insane or not, he deserves to (and should) die for his crimes. Instead of Riles' mental state, why don't you report on the irony of Riles' story. The fact that Riles murdered my father, and my tax dollars are keeping him alive is nothing short of ironic. "Helen Riles made the comment, 'I don't think he could ever come all the way back, I really don't. But he would able to feel more comfortable and get more rehabilitation.' Please let Mrs. Riles know that there is nothing that will ever bring my father back, and since Texas will not execute her brother, his 'discomfort' on death row is my only peace."

The television interview also included a statement of Riles’ sister responding to the idea of rehabilitation, and the email referenced Helen Riles’ comment and disputed it.

Timeline

• December 11, 1974 — Raymond Riles robbed and shot thirty-one year-old John Thomas Henry.
• Two days later (date not specified) — John Thomas Henry died; Raymond Riles was charged with his murder.
• 1985 (date not specified) — Raymond Riles set himself on fire in his cell in a prison suicide attempt.
• 1986 (date not specified) — A federal court issued a last-minute stay as Riles was inches from the death chamber in Huntsville; the opinion noted he was scheduled to be executed on September 17, 1986.
• Sept. 10, 1986 — The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion denying a certificate of probable cause and dismissing the appeal.
• August 13, 2008 (story update) — A television update said a nationwide debate continued and included the victim’s son’s email.
• Tuesday, Aug. 12, 2008 (story airing) — The televised interview and segment about Raymond Riles on death row aired.