Richard Michael Rossi

Case details

Richard Michael Rossi was convicted in Superior Court (Maricopa) of first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, and attempted first-degree murder. He was sentenced to death for the murder.

Timeline

• August 29, 1983 — Around 12:30 p.m., Rossi went to the Scottsdale home of Harold August, supposedly to sell a typewriter.
• April 10, 1984 — Start of trial.
• April 19, 1984 — Verdict.
• June 25, 1984 — Sentencing.
• January 22, 1986 — First resentencing.
• June 23, 1988 — Second resentencing.
• 1985 — Automatic, direct appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court resulted in vacating the original death sentence and remanding for resentencing.
• 1987 — Arizona Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded for resentencing.
• 1992 — Arizona Supreme Court upheld the imposition of the death penalty.

The offence

Around 12:30 p.m. on August 29, 1983, Rossi went to the Scottsdale home of Harold August, supposedly to sell a typewriter. Instead, he shot Mr. August three times. After the first two shots, Mr. August said, "You've got my money and you've shot me-what more do you want?" Rossi then shot August in the mouth, killing him.

A neighbor heard the shots and walked into the August home. Rossi hit her over the head with a blackjack and shot her twice in the chest. She survived.

Rossi used exploding bullets on both victims.

Investigation

The record includes that the defendant used special bullets designed to create greater tissue damage than typical ammunition.

Trial

The proceedings identified:

• Presiding Judge: Ed W. Hughes (trial, sentencing, resentencing); Philip W. Marquardt (second resentencing)
• Prosecutor: Cleve Lynch
• Start of Trial: April 10, 1984
• Verdict: April 19, 1984
• Sentencing: June 25, 1984
• Resentencing: January 22, 1986 (first resentencing) and June 23, 1988 (second resentencing)

Rossi’s convictions and other sentences, save the death penalty, were affirmed during the first appeal.

Sentencing

Rossi was sentenced to death for the murder on June 25, 1984.

Appeals

This was Rossi’s automatic, direct appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court.

State v. Rossi, 146 Ariz. 359, 706 P.2d 371 (1985) (Rossi I)

• The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the original death sentence and remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
• Aggravating circumstances:
  • Grave risk of death to others: reversed. The Court said the factor was not satisfied because the woman was an intended murder victim and had not been in the "zone of danger" during the victim's murder.
  • Pecuniary gain: upheld. The finding was not discussed except in reference to the constitutionality of this aggravating circumstance, previously decided in State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 694 P.2d 222 (1985).
  • Especially heinous/cruel/depraved: upheld. Cruelty, mental anguish, and physical pain were found, along with evidence and findings described in the record.
• Mitigating circumstances:
  • The Court vacated the death sentence because the trial court used the wrong standard to evaluate the (G)(1) and (G)(2) mitigating circumstances. The trial court thought that impairment under (G)(1) would have to rise to the level of a defense, and that duress under (G)(2) would have to rise to the level of a defense.
  • The Court also found that Rossi failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence his ability to be rehabilitated.
• Judgment from this appeal: death sentence vacated, not because of error in finding aggravation, but due to error in determining mitigation.

The narrative of later opinions states:

• In Rossi II, the Court found ability for rehabilitation but held lack of showing that Rossi was so impaired that he could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the murder; no opinion was expressed as to a sentence of life or death.

State v. Rossi, 154 Ariz. 245, 741 P.2d 1223 (1987) (Rossi II)

Aggravating circumstances described for this stage:

• Grave risk of death: previously reversed.
• Pecuniary gain: upheld (not discussed beyond constitutionality reference to State v. Nash).
• Heinous, cruel or depraved: upheld, including the cruel elements, mental anguish, physical pain, and findings under heinous or depraved such as gratuitous violence, relishing, senselessness, and helplessness.

The record includes detailed descriptions of the (F)(6) upholding:

• Cruel: upheld; mental anguish found; physical pain found.
  • The victim was grazed by the first gunshot and remained conscious after the second shot to the chest.
  • The victim had time to reflect, plead for his life, and that timing was described.
• Heinous or Depraved: upheld:
  • Gratuitous violence: found, including that defendant used special bullets designed to inflict greater tissue damage.
  • Relishing: found. Rossi bragged about the murder and gave three spent bullets as a "souvenir" to a friend.
  • Quote: Rossi said, "that the bullets did not make as big a hole as they're supposed to."
  • Senselessness: found. The murder was not necessary to complete the goal of robbery and escape.
  • Helplessness: found. The victim was sixty-six years old and in failing health, and was in no position to prevent the robbery after defendant shot him in the chest.

Mitigating circumstances in this stage included:

• The trial court used the wrong standard for (G)(1) and (G)(2), and Rossi failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence ability to be rehabilitated.

Judgment from this stage: sentencing affirmed in part and remanded for resentencing.

State v. Rossi, 171 Ariz. 276, 830 P.2d 797 (1992) (Rossi III)

• Judgment: sentence affirmed; the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the imposition of the death penalty for this murder.

Aggravating circumstances:

• Heinous, cruel or depraved: upheld.
  • Mental anguish and physical pain were tied to the record that the victim was in pain, was conscious for a short duration after being shot the second time, and had time to ponder uncertainty of his ultimate fate.
  • This was demonstrated by the victim telling Rossi, "you have my money, you shot me, what more do you want."
  • Heinous or depraved: upheld, with findings including:
    • Gratuitous violence: described through the holding that Rossi used bullets designed to inflict greater tissue damage on a human body.
    • Relishing: found. Rossi bragged to friends about the killing, gave three bullets to Bill Nelson as a souvenir, and complained that the bullets should have made a larger hole in the victim.
    • The record includes the quoted comment: "that the bullets did not make as big a hole as they're supposed to."
    • Senselessness: found. The record stated that defendant could have committed the burglary and escaped without committing the murder and that the defendant was "totally without regard for human life."
    • Helplessness: found. The victim was sixty-six years old, in poor health, and unable to prevent the burglary.
• Mitigating circumstances:
  • There is no discussion of mitigation in this opinion. The record directs attention to prior Rossi I and Rossi II opinions.

The record further states that at no time after the first appeal was the trial court's determination that the murder was committed in an especially "heinous, cruel, or depraved" manner ever at issue.

Other details

The record includes:

• Aggravating Circumstances noted on appeal: Grave risk of death to others (reversed on appeal as (F)(3)); Pecuniary gain (upheld as (F)(5)); Especially heinous/cruel/depraved (upheld as (F)(6)).
• Mitigating Circumstances: None sufficient to call for leniency.
• Rossi was resentenced multiple times: first after remand (January 22, 1986) and again after further remand (June 23, 1988).
• A neighbor survived the shooting and was hit over the head with a blackjack and shot twice in the chest.
• The record references the case names and citations:
  • State v. Rossi, 146 Ariz. 359, 706 P.2d 371 (1985).
  • State v. Rossi, 154 Ariz. 245, 741 P.2d 1223 (1987).
  • State v. Rossi, 171 Ariz. 276, 830 P.2d 797 (1992).
  • State v. Rossi (Rossi I), 146 Ariz. 359, 706 P.2d 371 (1985).
• The record references State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 694 P.2d 222 (1985) in relation to the constitutionality of pecuniary gain as an aggravating circumstance.