Tyrone Earl Walton

Case identity

Tyrone Earl Walton was convicted in 1988 of two counts of aggravated murder, one count of felony murder, and one count of robbery and was sentenced to death.

STATUS and sentencing outcome

Walton was sentenced to death on April 6, 1988. The sentence was commuted to life in 1989.

Background

Walton was convicted in 1988 of two counts of aggravated murder, one count of felony murder, and one count of robbery. Both counts of aggravated murder related to the same victim, but each alleged a different theory of the crime.

The offence

Two counts of aggravated murder related to the same victim, with each count alleging a different theory. Walton was also convicted of felony murder and robbery. The robbery conviction was not initially merged with the aggravated murder conviction based on the robbery.

Investigation

The proceedings described in this case record concerned appellate and post-conviction litigation rather than the investigation.

Trial

In Walton I, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed Walton’s convictions but vacated the death sentence and remanded the case for a new penalty-phase proceeding.

On remand, Walton’s counsel argued that the court lacked authority to impose consecutive sentences on the two counts of aggravated murder because they involved one victim and one single act. Counsel acknowledged, however, that the case law did not support that position. Walton was then sentenced to consecutive life sentences with 30-year minimum terms on the two counts of aggravated murder. The court merged the felony murder conviction into one of the aggravated murder convictions but did not merge the robbery conviction.

Appeals

Walton I

The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed Walton’s convictions but vacated the death sentence and remanded for a new penalty-phase proceeding. In State v. Walton, 311 Or 223, 809 P2d 81 (1991) (Walton I).

Walton II

After remand, Walton sought review of the imposition of consecutive life sentences and other sentencing issues. The Oregon Court of Appeals rejected Walton’s premise that his sentencing challenge covered only one aggravated murder conviction, noting that “the ‘death sentence applied to both convictions [for] aggravated murder.’” State v. Walton, 134 Or App 66, 71, 894 P2d 1212, rev den, 321 Or 429 (1995) (Walton II).

Walton also argued that the trial court erred by failing to merge his robbery conviction into an aggravated murder conviction based on the robbery. The Court of Appeals agreed that, under State v. Tucker, 315 Or 321, 845 P2d 904 (1993), robbery was a lesser-included offense of aggravated murder and should merge. Walton II, 134 Or App at 72-74.

The Court of Appeals remanded with instructions:

• “to vacate the robbery sentence”
• “and to enter an amended judgment merging the robbery conviction with one of the aggravated murder convictions.” Walton II, 134 Or App at 75.

Walton did not appeal from the resentencing following the remand in Walton II.

Post-conviction appeal (current proceeding)

Walton petitioned for post-conviction relief after the resentencing following Walton II. The post-conviction proceeding was appealed to the Court of Appeals with the following case details: “4 Appeal from Circuit Court, Marion County. Jamese Rhoades, Judge. Submitted on record and briefs March 10, 2004. James N. Varner filed the opening brief. Tyrone Walton filed the supplemental brief pro se. Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General, and Kathleen Cegla, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Haselton, Presiding Judge, Brewer, Chief Judge,* and Ortega, Judge.”

The Court of Appeals panel was identified as: “HASELTON, P. J.” and it stated: “Affirmed.” The record also includes “Brewer, C. J., vice Deits, J. pro tempore.”

Walton appealed the denial of his post-conviction relief petition, asserting trial court error in rejecting various claims. The Court of Appeals wrote “only to address petitioner's assertion that the trial court erred in rejecting his claim that his consecutive sentences on two counts of aggravated murder were unlawful under State v. Barrett, 331 Or 27, 10 P3d 901 (2000).”

Sentencing

Walton received consecutive life sentences with 30-year minimum terms on the two counts of aggravated murder after remand following Walton I. The trial court merged the felony murder conviction into one of the aggravated murder convictions but did not merge the robbery conviction.

Post-conviction relief claims

Walton alleged that trial counsel and appellate counsel involved in Walton I were inadequate in numerous respects. He also alleged he was denied a fair trial due to alleged prosecutorial misconduct in the initial proceeding.

His final claim for relief, which was the sole object of the Court of Appeals discussion, alleged that he was denied a fair trial and deprived of numerous constitutional rights because the trial court in the second and third sentencing proceedings “sentenced petitioner to a sentence not authorized by law.”

Outcome

The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief.

Legal reasoning included in the record (procedural bar and Barrett)

The Court of Appeals discussed that under State v. Barrett the imposition of multiple convictions for two counts of aggravated murder involving a single victim was improper, and that Walton’s convictions were analogous to those at issue in Barrett.

The Court of Appeals then addressed whether the post-conviction court properly denied relief based on ORS 138.550(2) and Palmer v. State of Oregon, 318 Or 352, 867 P2d 1368 (1994). It explained that ORS 138.550(2) bars grounds for post-conviction relief that could reasonably have been asserted in direct appellate review, and it discussed Palmer and North v. Cupp as part of the governing framework.

The Court of Appeals addressed Walton’s arguments that Palmer did not preclude a challenge under ORS 138.530(1)(c) (“[S]entence in excess of, or otherwise not in accordance with, the sentence authorized by law”). The Court of Appeals concluded that Palmer’s rationale applied to all grounds for post-conviction relief under ORS 138.530(1), including an “unauthorized sentence” claim under ORS 138.530(1)(c).

The Court of Appeals also discussed precedent on the “could not reasonably have been asserted” exception and overruled Myers v. Cupp, concluding Myers was “plainly wrong,” while ultimately holding that Walton’s Barrett-based challenge could reasonably have been raised on direct appeal in Walton II.

Other details

Case caption and participants

The record identifies:

• “Jamese Rhoades, Judge” (Circuit Court, Marion County)
• “James N.
• “Brewer, C. J., vice Deits, J. pro tempore”

Quotation preserved from the record

The Court of Appeals included the following quotation attributed to Walton II’s discussion of the prior challenge:

“the ‘death sentence applied to both convictions [for] aggravated murder.’”
State v.

The record also included a quotation attributed to Walton’s characterization of the sentencing issue:

“sentenced petitioner to a sentence not authorized by law.”

Numbered footnotes and legal citations preserved in the record

The record included the following footnote text (preserved as part of the case’s included legal discussion):

1. It described Walton’s argument as follows:

“Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences on his two aggravated murder convictions. His contention on appeal is that the trial court's failure to impose consecutive sentences on the aggravated murder convictions at the time that defendant was originally sentenced to death precluded the court from imposing them on remand. Defendant argues that he only challenged the death sentence, and that the death sentence applied only to one count of aggravated murder. Thus, defendant argues that he did not challenge the sentence on the other aggravated murder count and that, on remand, the court could not sentence him to a consecutive life term on that count.”
State v. Walton, 134 Or App 66, 71, 894 P2d 1212, rev den, 321 Or 429 (1995) (Walton II) (footnote omitted)

2. It stated:

“That aspect of Tucker was implicitly overruled by State v. Barrett, 331 Or 27, 37 n 4, 10 P3d 901 (2000). See State v. Ramsey, 184 Or App 468, 477 n 5, 56 P3d 484 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 479 (2003).”

3. It stated:

“On the other hand, had Barrett been the law at the time of petitioner's crime, his robbery conviction would not have been merged into one of the aggravated murder convictions. See ___ Or App at ___ n 2 (slip op at 2 n 2).”

4. It stated:

“Although our decision in Burnell issued nearly 10 months before Walton II, Walton II was argued and submitted for decision roughly six weeks before Burnell was argued and submitted.”

5. It stated:

“Given our analysis and disposition of that question, we need not decide whether the statutory interpretation announced in Barrett is to be given retroactive application in the context of post-conviction relief proceedings.”

6. It stated:

“We are, of course, well aware that the Oregon Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court may elect not to engage in discretionary review for myriad reasons and that that refusal does not imply any view as to the merits of the challenged decision. Nevertheless, in the face of repeated denials of review of other decisions presenting the same issue, appellate counsel might conclude, not unreasonably, that yet another petition raising the same claim would likely meet the same fate.”

7. It stated:

“As noted, to do so, we would have been required to conclude that Hessel, which we had decided only a couple of years before, was plainly wrong. See ___ Or App at ___ (slip op at 9). Cf. Burnell, 129 Or App at 107 (adhering to Hessel).”

Disposition line

The record concluded:

• “Affirmed.”