Dana Ray Edmonds

Name

Dana Ray Edmonds

Legal outcome

Edmonds was sentenced to death after a bench trial in 1983 for the robbery and capital murder of grocer John Elliott in Danville, Virginia. The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and denied Edmonds’ petition in 17 F.3d 1433 (Dana Ray Edmonds v. Charles E. Thompson, Warden, Mecklenburg Correctional Center). In No. 95-4002, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Edmonds’ motion for stay of execution and dismissal of his second federal habeas corpus petition. Edmonds was executed by lethal injection in Virginia on January 24, 1995.

Timeline

• In July, 1983 — Edmonds murdered John Elliott, a grocer in the City of Danville, during a robbery.
• 1983 — Following a bench trial, Edmonds was convicted of the robbery and capital murder of grocer John Elliott in Danville, Virginia.
• 1985 — Edmonds’ conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 807 (Va.1985).
• 1985 — The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Edmonds v. Virginia, 474 U.S. 975 (1985).
• 1986 — Edmonds filed a habeas corpus petition in the state trial court asserting numerous claims.
• August 31, 1992 — The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s findings, vacated Edmonds’ death sentence, and ordered the state to either reduce Edmonds’ sentence to life imprisonment or conduct a new sentencing procedure within 180 days.
• Oct. 27, 1993 — The case was argued in the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
• Feb. 16, 1994 — The Fourth Circuit issued a decision in 17 F.3d 1433.
• January 11, 1995 — Edmonds filed a habeas petition with the Supreme Court of Virginia asserting a conflict of interest based on his court-appointed attorney’s acceptance of another appointment.
• January 18, 1995 — The Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed Edmonds’ habeas petition, stating that no writ shall be granted on grounds that no writ shall be granted on the basis of any allegation the facts of which the petitioner had knowledge at the time of filing any previous petition. Code Sec. 8.01-654(B)(2).
• January 19, 1995 — Edmonds filed the instant petition in the district court.
• Jan. 23, 1995 — The Fourth Circuit submitted and decided No. 95-4002.
• January 24, 1995 — Edmonds was scheduled to be executed in Virginia and was executed by lethal injection.
• January 26, 1995 — The New York Times published “Inmate executed.”

The offence

Edmonds murdered grocer John Elliott in Danville, Virginia during a robbery. Elliott was first gagged. Edmonds stabbed Elliott in the neck with a knife and hit him in the head with a brick. The robbery netted $40 for Edmonds. Elliott was left behind the counter by the cash register and bled to death from his injuries.

Trial

After a bench trial, Edmonds was convicted in 1983 of the robbery and capital murder 1 of grocer John Elliott in Danville, Virginia. The court found two statutorily created aggravating factors—“future dangerousness” and “vileness”—to exist in Edmonds’ case and sentenced him to death for the murder.

The court failed to order a presentence report prior to entering judgment on the sentence. Upon Edmonds’ motion, the court vacated his sentence, ordered a presentence report, and scheduled a new sentencing proceeding. Although the judge had previously sentenced Edmonds to die, the judge did not recuse himself from presiding over the second proceeding, and Edmonds did not request recusal. On resentencing, the court reviewed the evidence that had previously been presented and, after also considering the presentence report and additional psychiatric evidence, once again found both aggravating factors and imposed the death sentence.

Sentencing

The death sentence was imposed after the trial court found both statutory aggravating factors. The Fourth Circuit described Virginia law as permitting imposition of a capital sentence only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused would either “commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society” (the “future dangerousness” aggravating factor) or “that his conduct in committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman” (the “vileness” aggravating factor).

The court found the latter aggravating factor was present because the act of murder involved torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery to the victim. It was found that Edmonds committed an aggravated battery by fracturing Elliott’s skull with a brick, dragging Elliott behind the meat counter of his store, slitting his throat, and stabbing him in the neck with a butcher knife while twisting the knife and severing his carotid artery.

The record included a final sentencing order stating: “the evidence clearly establishes that the crime was one of violence and that the defendant poses a high probability for future dangerousness.” The Fourth Circuit stated that the court may have inadvertently substituted the word “violence” for “vileness” and also stated that the court did not state explicitly in its order that it found either vileness or future dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt.

Trial counsel did not object to the order. The Fourth Circuit noted counsel’s testimony at the state habeas proceeding that he “had no doubt” that the court had strictly followed the statutory requirements, and “had no question” that it was aware of and applied the correct standard of review.

Appeals

Direct appeal

The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Edmonds’ conviction and sentence in *Edmonds v. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Edmonds v. Virginia, 474 U.S. 975 (1985).

Federal habeas appeal: 17 F.3d 1433

Edmonds argued ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing stage. The Fourth Circuit held it could not grant habeas relief based upon a claim that had not been asserted. It stated that the only meaning of Edmonds’ claim was that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the content of the sentencing order. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court granted Edmonds’ petition based solely on a claim that was not before it, and therefore the judgment had to be reversed. The Fourth Circuit held that Edmonds’ petition under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 was denied and that the judgment of the district court was affirmed with respect to issues contained in Edmonds’ cross-appeal.

The case caption included:

• 17 F.3d 1433 Dana Ray EDMONDS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Charles E. THOMPSON, Warden, Mecklenburg Correctional Center, Respondent-Appellant.
• v. Charles E. THOMPSON, Warden, Mecklenburg Correctional Center, Respondent-Appellee.
• Nos. 92-4011, 92-4012.
• United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
• Argued Oct. 27, 1993.
• Decided Feb. 16, 1994.
• Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, Roanoke.
• James C. Turk, District Judge. (CA-89-727-R)
• AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND PETITION DENIED.
• Opinion per curiam by ERVIN, Chief Judge, and HALL and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.

Second federal habeas appeal: No. 95-4002

In No. 95-4002, Edmonds appealed an order of the district court denying his motion for stay of execution and dismissing his second federal habeas corpus petition. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Edmonds’ sole claim was that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because of a conflict of interest on the part of his court-appointed attorney. The Fourth Circuit described that, during the pendency of the trial, Edmonds’ attorney accepted another appointment to represent Laverne Coles—Edmonds’ former girlfriend and a prosecution witness—in an unrelated criminal proceeding.

The Fourth Circuit described that the Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed Edmonds’ habeas petition on January 18, 1995, with the following statement: “No writ shall be granted on grounds that no writ shall be granted on the basis of any allegation the facts of which the petitioner had knowledge at the time of filing any previous petition. Code Sec. 8.01-654(B)(2).”

The Fourth Circuit addressed procedural default and the district court’s ruling on cause and prejudice. It stated that it disagreed with the district court’s conclusion that Edmonds had shown sufficient cause for the latest claim not being brought earlier. The Fourth Circuit relied on a psychiatric report prepared during the presentencing phase, quoting: “[Edmonds] indicated that at present, Ms. Cole [sic] is in the Danville City Jail for "beating her kids." [Edmonds] stated that she had beaten three of her four children. [Edmonds' attorney], who is also Ms. Cole's attorney, corrected the story indicating that the altercation occurred only with her oldest boy ...." (emphasis supplied).

The Fourth Circuit concluded that Edmonds had not demonstrated prejudice, stating that even if substitute counsel had impeached Coles more thoroughly, the sentencing court would still have sentenced Edmonds to death based on the vileness of Edmonds’ actions. The Fourth Circuit therefore held the claim was procedurally barred and Edmonds was entitled to no relief. The Fourth Circuit denied Edmonds’ application for stay of execution.

The case caption included:

• 46 F.3d 1123 Dana Ray EDMONDS, Petitioner--Appellant, v. John JABE, Warden, Greensville Correctional Center, Respondent--Appellee. No. 95-4002.
• Submitted: Jan. 23, 1995.
• Decided: Jan. 23, 1995.
• Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, and HALL and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.
• PER CURIAM: AFFIRMED.

Other details

Virginia law referenced for capital murder limited death penalty to defendants convicted of “capital murder,” defined as “willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing” committed in certain situations generally involving the commission of other specified crimes. The Fourth Circuit stated that Edmonds was convicted of violating Sec. 18.2-31(4), intentionally killing Elliott “in the commission of robbery ... while armed with a deadly weapon.”

The Fourth Circuit described Virginia law permitting imposition of a capital sentence only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt for “future dangerousness” and “vileness.” It noted that the presentence report was required by Va.Code Ann. Sec. 19.2-264(5) (Michie 1992) before imposing a death sentence in order to fully investigate relevant facts, including the defendant’s history, that might justify setting aside the death sentence in favor of imprisonment for life.

The Fourth Circuit stated that Edmonds’ ineffective assistance claim regarding counsel’s failure to object to the content of the sentencing order was phrased nearly identically in state and federal petitions, and concluded Edmonds did not raise the “failure to request recusal” ground at his state proceedings. It stated that even if leave to amend were granted to include the latter claim, the petition would have to be dismissed as containing unexhausted claims, referencing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982).

In Jarratt, Va., officials pronounced Edmonds dead at 9:14 P.M. hours after the United States Supreme Court denied his request for an appeal and Gov. George F. Allen denied a request for clemency. Before officials administered the drugs on Tuesday night, Edmonds said softly that he wanted to leave earth “in the grace of God.”

Judge James C. Turk of Federal District Court in Roanoke refused to halt the execution, conceding that Edmonds had been denied the constitutional right to effective counsel during trial. Judge Turk said the lawyer issue was raised too late to block the execution and would probably not have changed the outcome of the trial.