Johnny Lamar Wade

Case record: Johnny Lamar Wade

Background

Johnny Lamar Wade was convicted of murder in Newton County and sentenced to death by a Newton County jury. He was on parole at the time of the murder. Wade was 41 when he was sentenced to death in March 1987. He died in his cell of natural causes in June 2007. He was 51 when he died. He had throat cancer, and state prison officials said he died of natural causes, according to Georgia Department of Corrections spokesman Paul Czachowski.

Timeline

• August 8, 1986 — Thirteen-year-old Lance Barnes disappeared after riding his bicycle to Kittle's store.
• August 9, 1986 — Wade was questioned about the homicide the next morning.
• March 2, 1987 — The case was tried.
• March 4, 1987 — The death sentence was imposed.
• March 11, 1987 — A motion for new trial was filed.
• July 7, 1987 — The motion for new trial was heard and denied.
• September 30, 1987 — The notice of appeal was docketed in this court.
• January 11, 1988 — The case was orally argued.
• May 26, 1988 — The case was decided.
• June 22, 1988 — Reconsideration was denied.
• April 1989 — Wade was resentenced to death by another jury.
• June 6, 2007 — A report stated Wade died in his cell Tuesday morning, according to state prison officials.
• June 2007 — Wade died in his cell of natural causes.

The offence

On the morning of August 8, 1986, the victim, 13-year-old Lance Barnes, left his brother's house, where he had spent the night, and rode his bicycle to nearby Kittle's store.

Wade stopped at Kittle's store at 11:30 that morning. He bought a sandwich and told the owner that he was not going to pay further child support, and threatened to kill his ex-wife and her male companion if he saw either of them. Wade then played some video games, with the victim and another teenager. Wade left at 1:00 p.m.

The victim put his bicycle in the back of Wade's blue Ford pickup truck and left with him. Shortly thereafter, Wade was seen by a neighbor driving through his trailer park. A boy was with him. Wade did not go home then—possibly because his parents were there. Instead, sometime between 1:00 and 2:30 p.m., he went to the post office in Jersey, Georgia. He returned home alone about 3:00 p.m., went to bed, and worked a night shift.

At 6:48 p.m. (as shown by the store's video camera), Wade entered a Mr. B's convenience store and bought two packs of cigarettes.

That evening, the victim's body was discovered in a small clearing just off a narrow dirt lane that ran from the Alcovy Trestle Road through heavy woods to the Alcovy River. The victim's bicycle lay nearby. The victim had been beaten severely about the head and strangled to death.

Investigation

Wade was questioned about the homicide the next morning. He stated that he got off work at 10:00 a.m. the previous day. He said he went to a fast-food restaurant and ate breakfast, drove to a liquor store and bought some whiskey, and then went to Kittle's grocery, where he played video games with two teenagers, including the victim. Wade stated that as he was leaving, the victim asked him for a ride to his sister's house in Porterdale, and Wade offered to take him as far as Mr. B's convenience store on Highway 81 where he intended to buy some cigarettes. Wade said he arrived at Mr. B's between 12:00 and 1:00 p.m., dropped off the victim, and entered the store, purchasing his cigarettes from a certain cashier who worked there. He said he then went home, bathed, and went to bed. He denied ever having been on the dirt lane where the victim's body was found.

The defendant gave several statements that day and the next, and each was essentially the same. Although he was asked each time to describe in detail his activities on the day of the crime, he never mentioned driving through his trailer park with the boy in his vehicle, having gone to the post office in Jersey, or having been in Mr. B's convenience store at 6:48 p.m.

It was shown that the cashier at Mr. B's from whom Wade claimed to have purchased his cigarettes early in the afternoon of August 8 did not work at all that day. The cashiers who did work that day remembered that he stopped by that evening, but could not remember his being there at any other time that day.

Investigators at the crime scene discovered a stump obscured by vegetation on the right-hand side of the lane, opposite the small clearing on the left where the victim's body was found. The stump appeared to have been damaged recently. The state theorized that someone attempting to turn around in the narrow lane by backing into the clearing could have run over the stump.

A piece of chrome trim, a wire clip, and a chip of Ford Bahama Blue paint were found next to the stump. Wade's Ford truck was observed to have been damaged on its lower right front fender. A piece of chrome trim was missing from the bottom of the fender. Two retainers for the missing chrome trim remained on the fender; attached to one of these retainers was a wire clip identical to the one found at the crime scene, while the other retainer was missing its wire clip. A fresh leaf was caught in one of the retainers.

It was identified by a botanist as having come from a Japanese Honeysuckle plant, like that growing around the stump. The chrome trim piece found at the crime scene fit the fender of Wade's truck, and its ribbed design matched the chrome trim on the bottom of the door.

The paint on Wade's truck, a small amount of paint on the trim piece, and the paint chip found near the stump were microscopically and chemically analyzed and determined to be Ford Bahama Blue.

Between the crime scene and the town of Jersey, a stick covered with electrical tape, similar to one Wade commonly carried in the gunrack of his pickup, and consistent with having caused the injuries to the victim's head, was found by the side of the road. Abraded into a part of the surface of this stick was Ford Bahama Blue paint.

The defendant contended that the evidence failed to support his conviction for felony murder because the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (the stick) did not kill the victim; the cause of death was ligature strangulation. The contention was moot because Wade was sentenced only on the malice murder count, and the felony-murder conviction stood vacated by operation of OCGA 16-1-7 (a).

Arrest

Wade was arrested the next day.

Trial

Wade contended that the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (the stick) did not kill the victim, and the cause of death was ligature strangulation. This contention was moot because Wade was sentenced only on the malice murder count, and the felony-murder conviction was vacated by operation of OCGA 16-1-7 (a).

Evidentiary rulings and jury issues

The trial court did not err by admitting Kittle's testimony concerning Wade's threats toward his ex-wife and her male companion. The threats were made just before he met the victim. The court cited that these “acts and words of the defendant [were] so close in time to the alleged offense as to have a bearing upon his state of mind at that time.”

The defendant contended the trial court erred by allowing in evidence state's exhibit three, the stick found by the side of the road between the crime scene and Jersey. Several witnesses testified the stick looked similar to one commonly carried by Wade prior to the murder. After the murder, Wade no longer had the stick and told his interrogators that he could not remember what had happened to it. It was established that abraded onto the stick was Ford Bahama Blue paint, the same color as that on Wade's truck. The autopsist testified that the wounds to the victim's head were consistent with having been inflicted by a weapon such as state's exhibit three. The exhibit was held properly admitted.

Wade did not object to testimony that he had admitted having but “two female dates” in the eighteen months prior to the crime. The prosecutor argued: “I don't know why [the defendant] took a stick and beat him about the head. . . . A reasonable conclusion that could be drawn is sexual advancement. Why else do you take somebody out on a dirt road like that, a country road? But that might not be. That might not be right. There is no evidence of sexual molestation. It fits with the demeanor of the boy, his personality, that if he was approached about that, he would stand up and say no and if somebody's on the edge, like the defendant was that morning, yeah, it could trigger an explosion possibly. . . . I know if it was a sexual advancement, common sense would tell you that if he did make a sexual advancement on the boy and the boy said no and he had to take the stick and hit him one time, what was he going to do then? . . . Could he just say, well fine, I'm just going to drive out of here and forget this? Because that boy is going to regain consciousness; he's going to walk out of there; he's going to tell everybody. Where does that leave the defendant? So in his mind he's only got one choice: I've got to kill this person. Logical. . . . The motive for the killing, or lack thereof, was proper subject matter for the closing arguments of both the prosecution and the defense. The state s argument was based on the evidence and was not, as the defendant contends, improper. See Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113 (6) (303 SE2d 266) (1983) .”

Forensic plant evidence and the botanist

On March 24, 1987, the Tuesday before trial was to begin the next Monday, the district attorney and Wade's attorney went to the state crime lab, talked to the state's experts, picked up all the evidence and returned to Newton County. On Wednesday, the district attorney reviewed the evidence with the GBI agents who investigated the case and realized that no comparison or identification had been performed with respect to the leaf caught in the fender of Wade's truck.

The district attorney planned to take that leaf and several from the vicinity of the stump to a botanist employed by the Department of Fish and Game. The botanist examined them microscopically. On Friday the district attorney wrote a report dictated to him by the botanist, had the botanist sign it, and furnished a copy to the defendant.

Wade responded by filing a motion to exclude any testimony by the botanist on the ground that the written scientific report was not furnished at least 10 days before trial pursuant to OCGA 17-7-211. The trial court denied the motion to exclude but agreed to provide funds to Wade to enable him to retain his own botanist. The appellate court found no error in denying the motion.

Jury instructions and statutory aggravating circumstance

Wade argued the evidence did not warrant a charge on voluntary manslaughter, and the trial court did not err by refusing to give one.

The court's charge on implied malice was held not to be burden shifting.

Wade argued entitlement to discharge and acquittal due to delay in trial terms. The appellate court rejected the contention and held there was no merit because Wade was tried during the January 1987 term—the second regular term following the term in which his demand was filed—despite special juries being empaneled in the interim.

Wade argued the state's cross-examination of his mother at the sentencing phase incorporated a report from the Department of Family and Children Services (DFACS) that was inadmissible due to non-compliance with notice provisions of OCGA 17-10-2. The state counters included that Wade had a copy months before trial, and that the report was neither mentioned nor introduced in evidence. The appellate court held that use of the report to rebut the mother's direct testimony was not barred by OCGA 17-10-2.

The state contended at trial the murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of aggravated battery under OCGA 17-10-30 (b) (2). The court instructed the jury on this statutory aggravating circumstance, including the following instruction:

“The State contends that the offense of murder in this case was committed by the Defendant while he was engaged in the commission of an aggravated battery upon the body of the murder victim. Under our law, this is a statutory aggravating circumstance which would authorize, but not mandate, the imposition of the death penalty. The State has the burden of proving this statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. I charge you that a person commits aggravated battery when he maliciously, that is to say, with intent, causes bodily harm to another by depriving him of a member of his body, by rendering a member of his body useless, or by seriously disfiguring his body or a member thereof. I charge you that in order for you to find the existence of this statutory aggravating circumstance, you must find that the aggravated battery, if any, occurred prior to the victim's death. In other words, in determining whether or not an aggravated battery was committed upon the body of the murder victim, you may only consider facts occurring prior to the victim's death. That is, insofar as aggravated battery is concerned, only facts which are separate from and occurring prior to the act causing instantaneous death will support a finding of aggravated battery. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that this statutory aggravating circumstance exists, then your verdict should reflect this finding. Whether or not the statutory aggravating circumstance, which I have just given you in charge, exists beyond a reasonable doubt in this case, is a matter solely for you, the members of the jury, to decide and to determine from the evidence in this case.”

The appellate court further reviewed evidentiary sufficiency for aggravated battery, described that the victim was struck twice in the head with a heavy stick and then strangled to death with a ligature, and noted: one blow left a severe bruise on the victim's left cheek and ear; the other lacerated the victim's scalp and fractured his skull.

The appellate court held that there was error in the instruction concerning the malice element of aggravated battery due to incompleteness, describing that “maliciously” should have been defined as “intentionally and without justification or serious provocation,” and that the instruction “removed from the prosecution the burden of proving every element of the crime [of aggravated battery] beyond a reasonable doubt.”

The appellate court rejected harmless error.

Initial sentencing verdict

The jury's initial sentencing verdict read: “We unanimously find the following statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt: brutally beaten on head prior to death by strangulation . . . We unanimously fix the penalty as death.”

The court instructed the jury:

“Ladies and gentlemen, the verdict is not the verdict which would stand in law. We think we understand what it is that you're attempting to do but the verdict cannot be written and announced as you have attempted to write it . . . [T]he verdict has to be in a certain form.”

After further deliberations, the jury returned a verdict in proper form specifying the commission of an aggravated battery as set forth in OCGA 17-10-30 (b) (2). The appellate court held the initial verdict was “uncertain and ambiguous,” and it held the trial court did not err by returning the jury to the jury room for further deliberations.

Sentencing

Wade was sentenced to death on March 4, 1987, by a Newton County jury. The trial court imposed the death penalty following a sentencing phase verdict.

Appeals

The appellate case included: WADE v. THE STATE. 45060. (258 Ga. 324) (368 SE2d 482) (1988), CLARKE, Presiding Justice.

The appellate court affirmed the conviction and reversed the death sentence. The appellate court ordered the case remanded for resentencing. The appellate court held that the erroneous sentencing-phase charge on the sole statutory aggravating circumstance relied upon by the state required reversal of the death sentence, and it could not say the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Outcome

The conviction was affirmed, and the death sentence was reversed. The case was remanded for resentencing.

Wade was resentenced to death by another jury in April 1989.

Aftermath

Georgia death row inmate Johnny Lamar Wade died in his cell in June 2007. State prison officials reported his death on Tuesday morning, June 6, 2007. A Georgia Department of Corrections spokesman, Paul Czachowski, said Wade had throat cancer and died of natural causes. At that time, Georgia had 104 men on death row at the state prison in Jackson and one woman on death row at the state prison in southeast Atlanta.

Other details

The crime was committed on August 8, 1986. The case was tried March 2 through March 4, 1987. A motion for new trial was filed March 11, and the motion was heard and denied July 7, 1987. The notice of appeal was timely filed and docketed on September 30, 1987. The parties received extensions to file briefs, and the case was orally argued January 11, 1988. The trial was described as in Newton Superior Court, before Judge Ridgway, with John M. Ott, District Attorney; Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General; and Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General for appellee. Strauss & Walker, John T. Strauss, represented the appellant. The case was decided May 26, 1988, and reconsideration was denied June 22, 1988.