Louis Joe Truesdale

Case record: Louis Joe Truesdale

Status and execution

Louis Joe Truesdale was executed by lethal injection in South Carolina on December 11, 1998.

Timeline

• December 11, 1998 — Louis Joe Truesdale was executed by lethal injection in South Carolina.
• March 2, 1998 — Argued.
• April 29, 1998 — Decided: the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Truesdale’s federal habeas petition.
• September 13, 1996 — Truesdale filed a federal habeas petition.
• October 3, 1996 — Judicial Council Order No. 113 was adopted by the Judicial Council of the Fourth Circuit.
• April 5, 1980 — Rebecca Eudy’s car was found abandoned with a pool of blood on the passenger’s seat and floor.
• April 4, 1980 — Rebecca Eudy spent the evening with Sandra Marshall, then returned to her car at the Bi-Lo parking lot off S.C. 9 Bypass in Lancaster.
• April 6, 1980 — Around 2:30 a.m. on Sunday, April 6, police and Truesdale returned to the Sheriff’s Department.
• April 8, 1980 — Truesdale signed a statement prepared for him by police reiterating his confession to kidnapping and forcible sexual intercourse with Eudy and implicating an unidentified third person.
• December 1980 — Truesdale was tried for kidnapping, criminal sexual conduct, and murder.
• 1982 — The sentence was vacated on direct appeal and a new trial ordered (State v. Truesdale, 296 S.E.2d 528 (S.C. 1982)).
• 1983 — A second trial took place.
• 1984 — The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence (State v. Truesdale, 328 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1984)).
• 1985 — The U.S. Supreme Court denied Truesdale’s petition for a writ of certiorari (Truesdale v. South Carolina, 471 U.S. 1009 (1985)).
• 1986 — The U.S. Supreme Court granted Truesdale’s petition and vacated his death sentence (Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); Truesdale v. Aiken, 480 U.S. 527 (1987)).
• 1987 — Resentencing took place; the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence (State v. Truesdale, 393 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 1990)) after the 1987 resentencing.
• 1990 — The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence after resentencing (State v. Truesdale, 393 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 1990)).
• 1991 — The U.S. Supreme Court denied Truesdale’s certiorari petition (Truesdale v. South Carolina, 498 U.S. 1074 (1991)).
• 1993 — On state postconviction review, Truesdale introduced several pieces of new evidence about the circumstances of the crimes for which he stood convicted.
• 1996 — The U.S. Moore, 117 S. Ct. 527 (1996)).
• 1997 — The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit proceedings are reflected in the docket listed as “No. 97-24.”

The offence

Rebecca Eudy was murdered in 1980.

Background and victims

Rebecca Ann Eudy was an 18-year-old woman. Her death case involved kidnapping and sexual intercourse as described in court proceedings, and she died after being shot and raped.

Sandra Marshall, described as Eudy’s friend, had spent the evening of Friday, April 4, 1980, with Eudy.

Earl Eudy was Rebecca Eudy’s father. Evelyn Eudy was Rebecca Eudy’s mother. Rebecca Eudy’s 3 brothers were described as attending to watch the execution at Broad River Correctional Institution in Columbia.

Investigation

Rebecca Eudy’s car was found abandoned on Saturday, April 5, 1980, with a pool of blood on the passenger’s seat and floor.

Sandra Marshall told police she had seen a man in an army field jacket lurking around the parking lot where she and Eudy parted for the evening. She also told police that Eudy drove erratically out of the parking lot: Eudy did not turn on her lights, and she went to the wrong exit. Marshall pulled over to wait for her friend, and as Eudy passed, Eudy remained expressionless and did not wave or smile as she ordinarily did.

Police learned from witness Roy Curry that a man in an army jacket had been lurking around another parking lot earlier that evening before driving off in a car registered to Truesdale.

The police picked Truesdale up on the afternoon of April 5, informed him of his rights, and took him to the police station for questioning. Truesdale was again advised of his rights at the station. He said he understood them and proceeded to answer questions.

Truesdale claimed that he had been fishing Friday afternoon and playing pool with friends until 1:00 Saturday morning. Although not satisfied with his alibi, the police told Truesdale he was free to leave around midnight on April 5. Truesdale chose to stay with the police and accompanied them to track down the people with whom he said he had played pool. Truesdale fell asleep in the car, and when he awoke he told the police he “hadn't killed any girl.”

The police were not yet certain Eudy had been murdered at that time, and no one had suggested to Truesdale that anyone had been killed. The police’s suspicions were further aroused when one of the people with whom Truesdale claimed to have played pool could not satisfactorily corroborate his story.

Around 2:30 a.m. Truesdale said he wanted to go home; the police told him he was free to leave. Nevertheless, Truesdale continued to speak with the police and eventually told them to go to his mother’s house, where they would find a bloody pair of jeans and an army field jacket.

After the police retrieved the bloody clothes, Truesdale again waived his Miranda rights. Truesdale confessed that he had kidnapped Eudy and had sexual intercourse with her. He insisted he had been kidnapped and forced to commit these acts at gunpoint by an unidentified third person, who shot and killed Eudy. He then took the police to the field where Eudy’s body was located.

At this point, Truesdale was arrested for kidnapping, criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, and murder.

On April 8, 1980, Truesdale signed a statement prepared for him by the police reiterating his confession to kidnapping and forcible sexual intercourse with Eudy and implicating the unidentified third person in Eudy’s murder.

Arrest

Truesdale was arrested for kidnapping, criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, and murder after he took police to the field where Eudy’s body was located.

Trial

Truesdale was tried for kidnapping, criminal sexual conduct, and murder in December 1980.

Truesdale initially pled not guilty, but after the jury was selected he changed his plea to guilty. The jury recommended a sentence of death on the murder charge.

On direct appeal, the sentence was vacated and a new trial ordered (State v. Truesdale, 296 S.E.2d 528 (S.C. 1982)).

At the second trial in 1983, Truesdale again pled not guilty to all charges.

The State supplemented its evidence from the 1980 trial with ballistics evidence linking the bullets that killed Eudy to a gun found outside Truesdale’s mother’s house.

Truesdale’s counsel presented no evidence in his defense. The jury found Truesdale guilty of murder, criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, and kidnapping.

During the sentencing phase, the State introduced two photos of Eudy’s lifeless body as evidence of aggravation.

Truesdale unsuccessfully sought to introduce evidence showing his ability to adapt to prison life.

After deliberating for fifteen minutes, the jury recommended that Truesdale be sentenced to death.

The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence (State v. Truesdale, 328 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1984)). Truesdale’s petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was unsuccessful (Truesdale v. South Carolina, 471 U.S. 1009 (1985)).

After South Carolina courts denied his application for postconviction relief (PCR) (Truesdale v. Aiken, 347 S.E.2d 101 (S.C. 1986)), the U.S. Supreme Court granted Truesdale’s petition for a writ of certiorari and vacated his death sentence on grounds that Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), entitled him to introduce evidence of his adaptability to prison life (Truesdale v. Aiken, 480 U.S. 527 (1987)).

Sentencing

First sentencing and vacatur

After the 1980 guilty plea after jury selection, the jury recommended a death sentence on the murder charge. The sentence was vacated on direct appeal and a new trial ordered in 1982 (State v. Truesdale, 296 S.E.2d 528 (S.C. 1982)).

Second sentencing (1983 trial)

In the 1983 sentencing phase, the State introduced two photos of Eudy’s lifeless body as evidence of aggravation. After deliberating for fifteen minutes, the jury recommended a death sentence. Truesdale, 328 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1984)). The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari (Truesdale v. South Carolina, 471 U.S. 1009 (1985)).

Resentencing (1987)

Truesdale’s resentencing took place in 1987.

The State again presented evidence adduced during the guilt phase of the 1983 trial, supplemented with forensic evidence to establish that Eudy had been raped and that Truesdale could have been the rapist. The State again introduced a photograph of Eudy’s body as evidence of aggravation.

Truesdale countered with testimony from family and friends, teachers, employers, coworkers, and prison officials.

After twelve hours of deliberation, the jury again recommended a death sentence. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence (State v. Truesdale, 393 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 1990)). Truesdale’s certiorari petition to the U.S. Supreme Court was denied (Truesdale v. South Carolina, 498 U.S. 1074 (1991)).

Penalty-phase notes

Truesdale was also sentenced to thirty years imprisonment for criminal sexual conduct. Pursuant to South Carolina law, no sentence was imposed for kidnapping. Throughout the course of litigation, appeals focused only on the death sentence.

Appeals and postconviction

After the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed his death sentence, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on the resentencing.

On state postconviction review in 1993, Truesdale introduced several pieces of new evidence about the circumstances of the crimes of which he stood convicted. Many legal claims were dismissed as successive because not raised at the 1985 PCR proceeding or barred because not raised on direct appeal. Remaining claims, including the contention that his 1987 resentencing counsel was ineffective, were denied on the merits. His petition for a writ of certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court was denied, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied Truesdale’s petition for certiorari (Truesdale v. Moore, 117 S. Ct. 527 (1996)).

Federal habeas petition (28 U.S.C. § 2254)

Truesdale’s federal habeas petition was filed on September 13, 1996.

The district court denied the petition. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and dismissed the petition.

The federal appeal was docketed as:

• UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 97-24
• Louis Joe Truesdale, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Michael B. Moore, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections; Charles M. Condon, Attorney General, State of South Carolina, Respondents-Appellees.
• Argued: March 2, 1998; Decided: April 29, 1998.
• Dennis W. Shedd, District Judge.
• Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and WILLIAMS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Ineffective assistance claims at 1987 resentencing

Truesdale claimed constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel at his 1987 resentencing proceeding. He argued counsel’s errors fell into two categories:

1. failure to present evidence in mitigation or to rebut the State’s case on aggravating factors of kidnapping and sexual assault;
2. failure to raise a claim that African Americans were underrepresented in the jury pool in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The court concluded that neither of these claims provided a basis for habeas relief.

At his 1993 state PCR proceeding, Truesdale identified rebuttal and mitigating evidence counsel should have raised in 1987. He presented testimony of numerous witnesses including family, friends, acquaintances, attorneys, and experts. The witnesses testified, among other things, to his claimed prior romantic relationship with Eudy; the alleged inconclusiveness of forensic evidence that he raped Eudy or that he and she had any sexual relations; bloody fingerprints on Eudy’s car not matching Truesdale; and a claim that Truesdale suffered from organic brain dysfunction.

The Fourth Circuit described resentencing counsel’s strategy as attempting to downplay the brutal crimes and portray Truesdale as a normal person with a single aberrant episode of violence, aiming to downplay rehashing of kidnapping and rape evidence and to mitigate through abundant character evidence. Counsel also attempted to call the young son.

A quote from counsel appeared in the appellate opinion:

[W]e felt that he had already been convicted [of kidnap- ping and rape] and we wanted to try and stay away from all that evidence. We wanted to stay away from any rehashing of the same kinds of things that would hurt our case. We wanted to then try to mitigate, I think, as much as we could. We were looking more towards the mitigation, of calling the witnesses from C.C.I., which were a development that prior two trial lawyers didn't have available to them. And I remember distinctly calling the young son, which, again, by this time had grown in age and was a strategy to try to engender as much sympathy as we can for Louis, also showing that he could be rehabilitated, that he would be incarcerated but rehabilitated and perhaps save his life. . . . . In this case we had a fresh jury that had not heard the guilt phase. I was in hopes, I think at this point in time, seven years had passed from the first trial. I was in hopes that the solicitor perhaps would not be as sharp on his pre- sentation, that he wouldn't get the kinds of things in that perhaps cross examination might remind him of. I think that was our strategy, was try to minimize the guilt aspect of it and try to maximize the mitigation.

The appellate court held that counsel’s strategy met Strickland standards and that counsel reasonably chose not to introduce rebuttal evidence about the kidnapping and rape, reasoning that Truesdale had already confessed and responsibility for murder had been established by conviction. The court also addressed counsel’s decision regarding mental health evidence, including organic brain dysfunction.

Jury venire claims

Truesdale also alleged ineffective assistance for not objecting that South Carolina’s procedure for selecting jury venires violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The court held Truesdale could not raise claims relating to the 1980 and 1983 trials because they were not raised at the 1985 state PCR hearing, citing S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-90; Arnold v. State; and Aice v. State.

As to the 1987 venire claims, the Fourth Circuit held they were properly presented but had no merit. The court stated that to establish a fair cross-section violation Truesdale needed to show a distinctive segment substantially underrepresented due to systematic exclusion, and he did not advance direct evidence of systematic exclusion. The court also held he did not carry his burden on equal protection, including discriminatory purpose.

Remaining fair trial claims related to 1983 trial

The appellate court addressed three remaining fair trial claims that were not procedurally defaulted.

1. Right to remain silent: a police officer testified that Truesdale declared to police he “hadn't killed any girl,” and the officer’s remark arose when he told the jury Truesdale did not respond when asked what girl he was talking about. The appellate court assumed arguendo a Doyle v. Ohio violation but found any error harmless. The court noted Truesdale’s silence was not made known to the jury beyond that point, and the jury heard ample additional evidence of guilt including Truesdale’s partial confession.

2. Reasonable doubt instruction: Truesdale challenged the instruction by equating reasonable doubt with “a real doubt” and “a substantial doubt.” The court held the instruction, taken as a whole, did not dilute the government’s burden. The appellate opinion included the full reasonable doubt instruction in a footnote:

The state, however, is not required to prove the guilt of a defendant beyond all doubt or beyond every doubt, but beyond a reasonable doubt. The term reasonable doubt as used in these instructions is defined as a substantial doubt or a well-founded doubt arising out of the evidence or the lack of evidence. A rea- sonable doubt is not a weak doubt or a slight doubt, nor is a rea- sonable doubt a whimsical, fanciful or imaginary doubt, for a person may of course have these kinds of doubts about any prop- osition. A reasonable doubt then is a real doubt for which a per- son honestly seeking the truth can give a reason.

3. Exclusion of potential jurors: Truesdale challenged exclusion of jurors Johnnie McCluney and Willie Powell on grounds of alleged unwillingness to impose the death penalty. The Fourth Circuit held exclusion was consistent with Witherspoon v. Illinois and Lockhart v. McCree. The court described McCluney’s and Powell’s statements as showing ambiguity or flat unwillingness to sentence another to death.

Judicial Council Order No. 113 challenge

Truesdale also challenged Judicial Council Order No. 113, adopted October 3, 1996, which set guidelines for death penalty representation and imposed timetables for deciding 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255 petitions by defendants under sentence of death.

The Fourth Circuit described Order No. 113’s purposes:

• guidelines to ensure qualified representation of all capital defendants in federal courts;
• timetables for district courts to decide within 180 days (extendable up to thirty days) and for the court of appeals to decide within 120 days of reply brief filing, with time limits for rehearing.

Truesdale claimed the timetable aspect was invalid as inconsistent with AEDPA and because it was promulgated without public notice and opportunity for comment required by 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1). The Fourth Circuit rejected these arguments. It stated that Judicial Councils had broad authority under 28 U.S.C. § 332 to manage the expeditious resolution of judicial business and concluded the Order did not relate to “practice and procedure” in the manner requiring public notice and comment. The court also found Truesdale failed to identify prejudice and noted extensive litigation over eighteen years in his case.

The Fourth Circuit concluded that the jury’s verdict and sentence had substantial evidentiary support and were imposed in accordance with constitutional requirements, affirming dismissal of Truesdale’s habeas petition.

Other details: governor and final appeals

Gov. David Beasley refused to commute Truesdale’s sentence to life without parole.

The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond, Va., also denied Truesdale’s final appeal. Robb McBurney, a state attorney’s general, said the final appeal was denied.

Earlier, defense lawyer John Blume sent Beasley results of a lie-detector test that he said proved Truesdale did not deserve to die.

Blume said that to seek the death penalty, prosecutors had to prove aggravating circumstances such as kidnapping and rape. Blume said five witnesses who knew Truesdale said he had an ongoing sexual relationship with Eudy.

Blume said the lie-detector test proved Truesdale dated Eudy.

Blume also produced an affidavit from a lawyer who interviewed Pam Ross, described as the only black juror at Truesdale’s 1987 sentencing. The affidavit asserted that fellow jurors intimidated her into voting for the death penalty.

Two quotations were attributed to Pam Ross through attorney Leslie Hall:

"Ms. Ross said there were 2 young white male jurors who made remarks such as 'this nigger has to fry,'" attorney Leslie Hall said.